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Abstract
Apartheid is a loaded term; saturated with history and emotion. It conjures up images and 
memories of  discrimination, oppression, and brutality; indulgence, privilege, and preten-
sion; racism, resistance, and, ultimately, emancipation. All of  which come to us through 
the history of  apartheid in South Africa. Although prohibited and criminalized by inter-
national law in response to the situation in southern Africa, the concept of  apartheid 
was never given enormous attention by international lawyers. Following an awakening 
of  interest in the international legal prohibition of  apartheid as a potentially appropriate 
lens through which to view the situation of  the Palestinians, this article examines the 
merits of  such a claim in the context of  Israeli law and practice in the occupied Palestinian 
territory.
1 Introduction: The Apartheid Narrative
Apartheid is a loaded term, saturated with history and emotion. It instantly con-
jures up images and memories of  discrimination, oppression, and brutality; 
indulgence, privilege, and pretension; racism, resistance, and, ultimately, eman-
cipation. All of  these images come to us, of  course, through the history of  apart-
heid in South Africa. Although prohibited and criminalized by international law 
in response to the situation in southern Africa, the concept of  apartheid was never 
given enormous attention by international lawyers. Even after the codification of  
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its prohibition in various international treaties, as the regime of  racial suprem-
acy continued to fester in South Africa itself, the primary thrust of  the global 
anti-apartheid struggle that emerged in opposition to it was framed in moral and 
political terms, rather than in legal language. With the collapse of  the apartheid 
system in South Africa came the suspension of  the UN treaty-monitoring body for 
the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of  the Crime 
of  Apartheid1 (the ‘Group of  Three’),2 as well as the dissolution of  the Special 
Committee against Apartheid and the UN Centre Against Apartheid.3 Meanwhile, 
South Africa’s own internal transition focused on truth and reconciliation rather 
than the prosecution of  the crime of  apartheid.4
The Group of  Three asserted at the time that ‘thus far there is no claim by any 
State party that apartheid, as defined by the Convention, exists anywhere else than 
in southern Africa’.5 However, following isolated suggestions of  apartheid in Israel/
Palestine in the 1980s–1990s,6 the narrative of  ‘Israeli apartheid’ gained prolificacy 
in the wake of  the outbreak of  the second Palestinian intifada in 2000. Popular refer-
ences to apartheid began to infiltrate mainstream media circles and bestseller lists.7 
Prominent South Africans spoke and wrote about the painful memories of  apartheid 
that were resurrected upon visiting the West Bank and Gaza Strip,8 adding weight to 
the powerful symbolism of  the analogy. The South African government has in recent 
years begun to describe Israeli occupation practices as reminiscent of  apartheid: poli-
cies of  Jewish settlement and forcible displacement of  Palestinians in East Jerusalem 
are ‘reminiscent of  apartheid forced removals’;9 Israeli military order 165010 is 
1 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of  the Crime of  Apartheid (1973), 1015 UNTS 243, 
entered into force 18 July 1976.
2 UN Economic and Social Council, ‘Implementation of  the International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of  the Crime of  Apartheid: Report of  the Group of  Three established under the 
Convention’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/76, 25 Jan. 1995, at para. 20.
3 Ibid., at para. 12.
4 See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of  South Africa Report (1998).
5 Report of  the Group of  Three, supra note 2, at para. 17.
6 U. Davis, Israel: An Apartheid State (1987); Shah, ‘On the Road to Apartheid: The Bypass Road Network in 
the West Bank’, 29 Columbia Hmn Rts L Rev (1997–1998) 221.
7 See, e.g., M.  Bisharah, Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid: Occupation, Terrorism and the Future (2001); 
Noam Chomksy interviewed by Christopher J. Lee: ‘South Africa, Israel-Palestine, and the Contours of  the 
Contemporary Global Order’, Safundi, 9 Mar. 2004; U. Davis, Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle 
Within (2004); McGreal, ‘Worlds Apart’, The Guardian, 6–7 Feb. 2006, available at: www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2006/feb/06/southafrica.israel; J. Carter, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (2006); Finklestein, 
‘The Ludicrous Attacks on Jimmy Carter’s Book’, Counterpunch, 28 Dec. 2006.
8 See, e.g., Tutu, ‘Apartheid in the Holy Land’, The Guardian, 29 Apr. 2002, available at: www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2002/apr/29/comment.
9 South African Government Information, ‘South Africa’s response to latest Israeli settlement activities in 
East Jerusalem’, 24 Nov. 2009, available at: www.info.gov.za/speeches/2009/09112415151001.htm.
10 Order regarding Prevention of  Infiltration (Amendment No. 2) (Judea and Samaria) (No. 1650) 5769-
2009), 13 Oct. 2009. This order significantly expands the definition of  ‘infiltrator’, and potentially allows 
for the arrest or deportation – without judicial review – of  any Palestinian in the West Bank, even those 
born or permanently residing there.
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‘reminiscent of  pass laws under apartheid South Africa’.11 Israeli academics,12 jour-
nalists and newspaper editors,13 and even former municipal representatives14 and 
government ministers,15 began to criticize their own government’s treatment of  the 
Palestinians as analogous to, or worse than, apartheid. The situation prompted Israeli 
leaders on the ‘moderate’ end of  the political spectrum to express concerns that a 
failure to end the occupation would leave Israel facing a South African-style anti-
apartheid struggle for equal rights, which would ultimately bring about the demise of  
Israel, at least as a Jewish national state.16
Since 2007, the question of  the relevance of  apartheid not merely by ana logy 
to South Africa, but as defined by international law, has started to gain currency 
with authorities in the UN. Then President of  the General Assembly, Miguel 
d’Escoto Brockmann, spoke in late 2008 of  the importance of  the UN using the 
apartheid terminology to describe Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian 
territory:
I believe it is very important that we in the United Nations use this term. We must not be afraid 
to call something what it is. It is the United Nations, after all, that passed the International 
11 South African Department of  International Relations and Cooperation, ‘Media Statement: Israeli Inflitration 
Order 1650’, 21 Apr. 2010. It is also worth noting that in July 2011, the Advertising Standards Authority 
of  South Africa dismissed a complaint lodged by the South African Jewish Board of  Deputies against a radio 
commercial for South African Artists Against Apartheid, finding that the analogy made between Israel and 
apartheid in the commercial is capable of  substantiation through documentary sources, and as such is not 
misleading. See Advertising Standards Authority of  South Africa, Ruling of  the ASA Directorate in the mat-
ter of  South African Jewish Board of  Deputies v. South African Artists Against Apartheid, 5 July 2011.
12 See, e.g., Yiftachel, ‘Neither Two States Nor One: The Disengagement and “Creeping Apartheid” in Israel/
Palestine’, 8(3) The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du monde arabe (2005) 125; Halper, ‘Countdown 
to Apartheid’, Counterpunch, 25 May 2006; Haaretz Staff  and Fora.tv, ‘Prof. Avi Shlaim – Settlements 
turned Israel into apartheid state’, Ha’aretz, 21 Nov. 2008, available at: www.haaretz.com/news/
video-prof-avi-shlaim-settlements-turned-israel-into-apartheid-state-1.285464.
13 See, e.g., Goodman, ‘Israeli Journalist Amira Hass Reflects on Reporting Under Occupation’, Democracy 
Now, 12 Apr. 2005, available at: www.democracynow.org/2005/4/12/israeli_journalist_amira_hass_
reflects_on; Lappin, ‘Zionist Federation cancels Haaretz journalist: Columnist Danny Rubinstein report-
edly likens Israel to apartheid South Africa’, Yediot Aharonot, 31 Aug. 2007, available at: www.ynetnews.
com/articles/0,7340,L-3444320,00.html; HaLevi, ‘Haaretz Editor Refuses to Retract Israel Apartheid 
Statements’, Arutz Sheva, 5 Sept. 2007, available at: www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.
aspx/123596#.UZPGV3Bqba4; Levy, ‘Twilight Zone/Worse than Apartheid’, Ha’aretz, 12 July 2008, 
available at: www.haaretz.com/twilight-zone-worse-than-apartheid-1.249503; Laor, ‘Israel’s apart-
heid is worse than South Africa’s’, Ha’aretz, 8 Nov. 2009; available at: www.haaretz.com/print-edition/
opinion/israel-s-apartheid-is-worse-than-south-africa-s-1.4590.
14 Benvenisti, ‘Bantustan Plan for an Apartheid Israel’, The Guardian, 26 Apr. 2004, available at: www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/26/comment.
15 Aloni, ‘Indeed there is apartheid in Israel’, Middle East News Service, 10 Jan. 2007 (translation 
of  Hebrew original published in Yediot Aharonot on 31 Dec. 2006, available at: www.ynet.co.il/
articles/0,7340,L-3346283,00.html); Sarid, ‘Yes, it is apartheid’, Ha’aretz, 25 Apr. 2008, available at: 
www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/yes-it-is-apartheid-1.244643.
16 McCarthy, ‘Israel risks apartheid-like struggle if  two-state solution fails, says Olmert’, The Guardian, 30 
Nov. 2007, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/nov/30/israel; McCarthy, ‘Barak: make 
peace with Palestinians or face apartheid’, The Guardian, 3 Feb. 2010, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2010/feb/03/barak-apartheid-palestine-peace.
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Convention against the Crime of  Apartheid, making clear to all the world that such practices 
of  official discrimination must be outlawed wherever they occur.17
Prior to this, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the 
Palestinian territories had raised the issue of  whether Israel’s practices might fit the 
legal definition of  apartheid. In his January 2007 report, he framed the question thus:
Israel is clearly in military occupation of  the OPT. At the same time, elements of  the occu-
pation constitute forms of  colonialism and of  apartheid, which are contrary to interna-
tional law. What are the legal consequences of  a regime of  prolonged occupation with 
features of  colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the occupying Power and 
third States?18
This question was taken up by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of  South 
Africa, which in 2008 convened a team of  international lawyers from Palestine, 
Israel, South Africa, and Europe to examine these questions of  whether the interna-
tional legal prohibitions of  colonialism and apartheid had been breached by Israel in 
the Palestinian territories, and, if  so, with what legal consequences. The findings were 
published as a preliminary study in 2009 and then in full book form in 2012, and con-
cluded, inter alia, that there exists in the occupied Palestinian territory an institution-
alised and oppressive system of  Israeli domination and oppression over Palestinians as 
a group; that is, a system of  apartheid.19
Richard Falk, when interviewed in March 2009, not long after taking up the 
reins as the UN Special Rapporteur, questioned whether the apartheid ‘analogy’ 
was a ‘tactically useful language to use’. Professor Falk stressed that ‘each situa-
tion has its originality’, and that while there are certainly resemblances between 
the Palestinian situation and apartheid South Africa, there are also dissimilarities. 
He thus suggested that drawing comparisons to apartheid is ‘less useful than to 
focus directly on the realities of  the occupation as it affects the daily lives of  the 
Palestinian people’.20 Although the question he was responding to referred to the 
international crime of  apartheid, it was clear from his language that at that point 
Professor Falk was conceptualizing the question of  apartheid as one of  analogy to 
South Africa, rather than one for consideration on its own merits under the norms 
of  international law.
17 Speech of  the President of  the UN GA, Miguel d’Escoto, UN Headquarters, New York, 24 Nov. 2008, avail-
able at: www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/7245_Brockmann_GA.pdf.
18 J. Dugard, ‘Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the situation of  human rights in the Palestinian territ-
ories occupied since 1967’, UN Doc. A/HRC/4/17, 29 Jan. 2007, at 3.
19 V. Tilley (ed.), Beyond Occupation: Apartheid, Colonialism and International Law in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (2012), at 107–221.
20 Balsam, ‘Palestinians are winning the legitimacy war: interview with Richard Falk’, Alternative 
Information Center, 17 Mar. 2009. Professor Falk reiterated the same idea in another subsequent inter-
view, stressing that ‘[c]omparisons of  this sort can be illuminating, although misleading at the same 
time. … Prolonged occupation of  the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, along with the 
second class citizenship imposed on the Palestinian minority living behind the green line, are humanly 
abusive, but distinctive in their character, and it is important to understand these realities on their own 
terms’: see Chehata, ‘Richard Falk: “I believe that Hamas should be treated as a political actor”’, Middle 
East Monitor, 9 Apr. 2010.
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This was before the initial publication of  the HSRC study in the summer of  2009. 
By the time he submitted his Special Rapporteur’s report to the General Assembly in 
October 2010, Professor Falk’s views on the matter had evolved:
It is the opinion of  the current Special Rapporteur that the nature of  the occupation as of  2010 
substantiates earlier allegations of  colonialism and apartheid in evidence and law to a greater 
extent than was the case even three years ago. The entrenching of  colonialist and apartheid 
features of  the Israeli occupation has been a cumulative process. The longer it continues, 
the more difficult it is to overcome and the more serious is the abridgement of  fundamental 
Palestinian rights.21
The Special Rapporteur derived much of  his argument regarding the ‘general struc-
ture of  apartheid that exists in the Occupied Palestinian Territories’ from the HSRC 
study, which he described as ‘an expert study that is both reliable and convincing’.22
This article seeks to provide an overview of  the applicability of  the international 
legal prohibition of  apartheid to the occupied Palestinian territory. Before address-
ing this subject a few brief  comments are made in section 2 about the purpose and 
scope of  the article. Section 3 then outlines the laws and practices that embodied the 
system of  apartheid in South Africa itself  from 1948 until 1994. Section 4 reviews 
the development and codification of  the prohibition of  apartheid in international law, 
and addresses the question of  the relevance and application of  the norm prohibiting 
apartheid beyond South Africa. Section 5 assesses the applicability of  the apartheid 
paradigm to Israel’s occupation of  Palestinian territory, while the final section offers 
some concluding remarks.
2 Purpose and Scope
Many will find the linking of  Israel’s practices and policies in the occupied Palestinian 
territory (OPT) with apartheid to be offensive. They will complain, as Richard 
Goldstone has, that this is an ‘unfair and inaccurate slander against Israel’ that seeks 
to ‘demonize and delegitimize it’.23 In these circumstances it is incumbent upon the 
authors to explain the purpose of  the present article.
The purpose of  this article is not to provide fuel for the delegitimization of  the state of  
Israel. It is to consider whether there is any substance in the assertions referred to above 
that Israel’s practices and policies in the OPT fall within the prohibition of  apartheid, as it 
is understood in international law. It is a doctrinal legal enquiry conducted in the language 
of  international law and in the context of  contemporary norms of  international law.
Most objections to the comparison of  Israel’s treatment of  Palestinians with that 
of  apartheid are based on the questionability of  such an analogy to Israel’s regime 
in Israel itself  rather than in the OPT.24 It is true that studies have been published 
21 R. Falk, ‘Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the situation of  human rights in the Palestinian territories 
occupied since 1967’, UN Doc. A/65/331, 30 Aug. 2010, at para. 3.
22 Ibid., at para. 5.
23 Goldstone, ‘Israel and the Apartheid Slander’, NY Times, 1 Nov. 2011, at A27.
24 See, e.g., ibid.
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which make such a comparison.25 In November 2011, the Russell Tribunal on 
Palestine, sitting in Cape Town, found that ‘Israel subjects the Palestinian people to 
an institutionalised regime of  domination amounting to apartheid as defined under 
international law’. While recognizing that Israel’s ‘discriminatory regime manifests 
in varying intensity and forms against different categories of  Palestinians depending 
on their location’ and that Palestinians living in the OPT are ‘subject to a particu-
larly aggravated form of  apartheid’, the Tribunal concluded that ‘Israel’s rule over the 
Palestinian people, wherever they reside, collectively amounts to a single integrated 
regime of  apartheid’.26
Such a finding is controversial insofar as it encompasses the situation inside Israel 
because, as the Russell Tribunal itself  acknowledged, Palestinians in Israel, unlike the 
black population of  apartheid South Africa, are enfranchised citizens entitled to hold 
public office. Although the ability of  the subordinate racial group to vote does not 
preclude the existence of  a system of  apartheid – particularly in a context where the 
dominant group is not a demographic minority as it was in South Africa – consid-
erations of  this kind do make characterizations of  the discriminatory regime inside 
Israel as one of  apartheid in and of  itself  more contentious. The present article does 
not engage in the debate over the applicability of  the international legal prohibition 
of  apartheid inside Israel,27 confining itself  to the firmer ground of  apartheid in the 
OPT. Both current and previous Special Rapporteurs have raised the matter of  apart-
heid in the execution of  a mandate to address human rights issues in the Palestinian 
territories occupied by Israel in 1967. We proceed on the basis of  a similar territorial 
mandate, addressing the situation inside the Green Line only where Israel’s internal 
laws and policies illuminate its practices in the occupied territories. We acknowledge, 
however, the problems inherent in the prescription of  such territorial compartmen-
talization by international law where Israel’s legal governance does not make such 
simplistic demarcations.
3 Apartheid in South Africa
The ideology of  apartheid28 came to full fruition in South Africa with its formaliza-
tion as official state policy upon the assumption of  power by the (white Afrikaner) 
National Party in 1948. Its seeds had been sown over the course of  three preceding 
25 See Davis, supra note 6; S. Nathan, The Other Side of  Israel. My Journey across the Jewish-Arab Divide (2005).
26 Russell Tribunal on Palestine, Findings of  the South Africa Session (Nov. 2011), at paras 5.44 and 5.45. On 
the role of  civil society tribunals such as the Russell Tribunal as truth-telling mechanisms that represent 
a ‘jurisprudence of  conscience’ see Falk, ‘Is Israel guilty of  the crime of  apartheid?’, Al-Jazeera, 5 Dec. 
2011.
27 As the findings of  the Russell Tribunal suggest, however, there certainly are grounds for further inquiry 
into the question of  apartheid as a single regime of  domination over the Palestinian people as a whole, 
including the Palestinian population inside Israel. This is relevant not least in the light of  legislative 
developments in the Israeli Knesset under coalition governments led by Benjamin Netanyahu from 
2009.
28 Apartheid is the Afrikaans word for ‘separateness’, also used to connote ‘separate development’. See fur-
ther D. Welsh, The Rise and Fall of  Apartheid (2009).
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centuries of  European settlement and colonialism, during which time black South 
Africans were stripped of  their land, liberties, and political rights. Segregation 
was long established as the foundation for race relations in South Africa. The pass 
system, for instance, entailing the restriction of  the movement and residence of  
Africans through permit requirements, was first introduced by the British colonial 
authority in 1809. For the National Party, by 1948, such forms of  segregation, 
which resembled those found in many European colonies of  that time, were not 
enough to guarantee sustainable white domination in South Africa. Apartheid 
went further by institutionalizing racial discrimination. Initially this took the 
form of  white domination by means of  unequal access to social services, but was 
later extended to include territorial separation, which the National Party labelled 
as a form of  self-determination known as ‘separate development’. This led in due 
course to the granting of  ‘independence’ to four Bantustans – Transkei, Ciskei, 
Bophutatswana, and Venda.29
Apartheid in South Africa was a system structured on three pillars: discrimination, 
territorial fragmentation, and political repression. It was an institutionalized system 
in the sense that it was created by law and enforced by legal institutions. While rein-
forced by social convention and practice, it was this institutionalized character that 
made it particularly visible and offensive.30
A Discrimination
Racial groups in South Africa were determined by a strict system of  race classifica-
tion.31 The Population Registration Act of  195032 directed the Secretary of  the Interior 
to compile a register of  the entire South African population which was to reflect the 
classification of  each individual ‘as a white person, a coloured person33 or a Bantu,34 
as the case may be, and every coloured person and every Bantu whose name is so 
included shall be classified by the Secretary according to the ethnic or other group to 
which he belongs’.35 The ‘coloured’ group was divided into seven sub-groups which 
included Indian and Chinese. Race classification was made on the basis of  appearance, 
social acceptance, and descent. The purpose of  race classification was to determine 
the social, economic, and political status of  South Africans. It was not a system of  
differentiation but one of  discrimination, as persons classified as ‘coloured’ or ‘Bantu’ 
were relegated to an inferior racial stratum with lesser rights. The ‘purity’ of  each 
29 For a history of  the political institutions of  apartheid see J. Dugard, Human Rights and the South African 
Legal Order (1978), at 89–102; J. Dugard, N. Haysom, and G. Marcus (eds), The Last Years of  Apartheid: 
Civil Liberties in South Africa (1992), at 10–17.
30 For a full examination of  the laws of  apartheid see Dugard, supra note 29, at 53–202, and Dugard et al., 
supra note 29, at 3–54.
31 See Suzman, ‘Race Classification and Definition in the Legislation of  the Union of  South Africa 1910–
1960’, Acta Juridica (1960) 339.
32 Act 30 of  1950.
33 That is, a person of  mixed descent.
34 This was the term used to describe black Africans in the apartheid era.
35 S. 5(2) of  the Act.
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group was maintained by laws prohibiting inter-marriage between the races36 and 
sexual relations between members of  different racial groups.37
Other statutes prescribed the discriminatory regime of  apartheid. The Reservation 
of  Separate Amenities Act of  195338 provided for separate but unequal facilities 
for different racial groups in all spheres of  life – trains, buses, restaurants, theatres, 
cinemas, libraries, parks, playing fields, beaches, and swimming pools. Schools and 
universities were segregated by law, with inferior institutions created for coloureds, 
Indians, and blacks (Bantu).39 Prestigious and well-paid jobs were reserved by law 
for whites.40 Residential areas in the towns and cities were zoned into separate racial 
suburbs with the better developed and more prosperous areas allocated to whites.41 
Rural areas were likewise zoned along racial lines, with just 13 per cent of  the country 
allocated to the black majority and the rest reserved for exclusive white ownership and 
occupation.42 As a result, the majority of  South Africa’s agricultural land was held by 
whites. The racial zoning of  areas in both towns and country resulted in large-scale 
population displacements with untold suffering.
Serious restraints were placed on the movement of  black people in the towns and 
cities. They were required at all times to carry a permit – a ‘pass’ – indicating permis-
sion to be in the town or city in question. Failure to produce such documentation to a 
police officer on demand, or to be present in the town or city in question without per-
mission was a criminal offence.43 Thousands of  blacks were sentenced to short periods 
of  imprisonment each year for violation of  the hated ‘pass laws’.44 General respect for 
the law was seriously undermined by the implementation of  such laws.
B Territorial Fragmentation
The National Party inherited the system of  territorial separation in 1948 that had 
set aside 87 per cent of  the country’s land for exclusive white ownership and occupa-
tion.45 When Hendrik Verwoerd became Prime Minister in 1958, the apartheid regime 
– in response to international pressure to respect the principle of  self-determination 
– sought to portray apartheid as a policy of  separate development rather than one 
of  racial domination. This required the allocation of  territory to the different tribal 
groups within the black community and resulted in an institutionalization of  the 
extant system of  territorial fragmentation.46
36 Prohibition of  Mixed Marriages Act 55 of  1949.
37 Immorality Act 23 of  1957.
38 Act 49 of  1953, as amended by Act 10 of  1960.
39 Extension of  University Education Act 49 of  1959.
40 See Dugard, supra note 29, at 85–89.
41 In terms of  the Group Areas Act 41 of  1950.
42 Bantu Land Act 27 of  1913 and the Bantu Trust and Land Act 18 of  1936.
43 See the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 24 of  1945 and the Bantu (Abolition of  Passes and 
Co-ordination of  Documents) Act 67 of  1962.
44 See Dugard, supra note 29, at 71–78.
45 Ibid., at 78–79.
46 The principal statute in this regard was the Promotion of  Bantu Self-Government Act 46 of  1959.
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The black population, comprising some 80 per cent of  the population of  South 
Africa, was divided into ten tribal groups with a separate homeland or Bantustan cre-
ated for each: Transkei, Ciskei, Bophutatswana, Venda, KwaZulu, Lebowa, Gazankulu, 
Qwaqwa, KaNgwane, and KwaNdebele. All of  these tribal groups advanced to self-
government with their own representative authorities. Four – Transkei (1976), 
Bophutatswana (1977), Venda (1979), and Ciskei (1981) – became ‘independent’, 
having their own presidents, executive governments, legislatures, and courts. They 
were, however, controlled both covertly and overtly by the apartheid regime`s security 
forces and heavily subsidized by Pretoria. Such subsidies included the construction of  
hospitals, schools, universities, roads, and dams, and the development of  industrial 
areas. None of  the ‘independent’ Bantustans – known collectively as the ‘TBVC’ states 
– were recognized by other states, as a result of  calls by the UN for non-recognition.47
One of  the consequences of  the nominal independence of  the Bantustan states was 
that all persons ethnically connected with such a homeland, including those who lived 
and worked in ‘white’ South Africa, lost their South African nationality and became 
nationals/citizens of  the unrecognized state in question. In this way the apartheid 
regime sought to rid itself  – at least on paper – of  South Africa’s black population.
C Political Repression
Apartheid was enforced and maintained by a brutal security apparatus operating 
under Draconian laws which gave wide powers to the security forces and largely 
removed the review powers of  the courts.48 Opposition parties, such as the African 
National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, and the Communist Party, were pro-
scribed;49 political assembly, freedom of  speech, and press freedom were curtailed and 
censorship was rife. Political opponents were subjected to house arrest or restriction 
orders limiting their movement, careers, and right to meet with others. Indefinite 
detention without trial for the purpose of  interrogation was authorized,50 resulting 
in widespread torture and unexplained deaths. Administrative detention was enabled 
although not widely practised.51 Emergency powers were invoked in 1960 and 
from 1985 to 1990.52 The security police, freed from judicial oversight and political 
accountability, committed murder and torture and were responsible for the disappear-
ance of  political activists. The openly authorized targeted killing of  political opponents 
as practised by Israeli forces in Palestine was, however, largely unknown.
D South West Africa/Namibia
The policies and practices of  apartheid were replicated by the South African authori-
ties in the territory of  South West Africa – present-day Namibia – which South Africa 
47 See J. Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (1987), at 96–97.
48 See further, Dugard, supra note 29, at 107–202; Dugard et al., supra note 29, at 21–27, 32–94.
49 Internal Security Act 44 of  1950, previously known as the Suppression of  Communism Act; Internal 
Security Act 74 of  1982; Unlawful Organizations Act 37 of  1960.
50 By s. 6 of  the Terrorism Act 83 of  1967.
51 Dugard, supra note 29, at 113.
52 Marcus, ‘Civil Liberties Under Emergency Rule’, in Dugard et al, supra note 29, at 32–54.
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administered under a mandate conferred by the League of  Nations.53 Most of  the dis-
criminatory and repressive laws of  the apartheid legal order were extended to South 
West Africa, and different racial groups were allocated separate territories and repre-
sentative authorities along the lines of  separate development in South Africa itself.54 
In 1971 the International Court of  Justice held that South Africa unlawfully occupied 
the territory following the revocation of  the Mandate for South West Africa by the UN 
General Assembly, and that apartheid as applied in the territory violated South Africa’s 
obligations under the Charter of  the UN.55 Despite this ruling, South Africa continued 
to occupy and administer the territory until it achieved independence in 1990.
The policies and practices of  apartheid in South Africa and South West Africa fea-
tured sporadically on the agendas of  the political organs of  the UN from its inception. 
When pleas for abandonment of  these policies failed, the UN sought to outlaw and 
criminalize apartheid.
4 Apartheid in International Law
Apartheid has acquired a legal content that derives from – but is at the same time inde-
pendent of  – the South African experience, and now permeates a number of  branches 
of  public international law. From the 1960s onwards, with the ‘non-aligned’ states 
having assumed a majority at the UN in the wake of  the wave of  decolonization in 
Africa and Asia, concerns over the inherent malice of  the apartheid system in south-
ern Africa were addressed in treaties of  international human rights and humanitar-
ian law, the adoption of  a specific international convention to criminalize apartheid, 
and through the procedures and resolutions of  the General Assembly and Security 
Council.
A Human Rights Law
While any system of  institutionalized racial discrimination would inherently conflict 
with the non-discrimination clause contained in Article 2 of  the Universal Declaration 
of  Human Rights, the first instrument of  international law expressly to proscribe the 
practice of  apartheid was the International Convention for the Elimination of  All 
Forms of  Racial Discrimination.56 In the Convention’s preamble, the states parties 
emphasize their alarm at ‘manifestations of  racial discrimination still in evidence in 
some areas of  the world and by governmental policies based on racial superiority or 
hatred, such as policies of  apartheid, segregation or separation’. Article 3 then lays 
down an obligation for the signatories to oppose and eliminate apartheid:
53 See generally J. Dugard, The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute (1973).
54 Ibid., at 431–435.
55 Legal Consequences for States of  the Continued Presence of  South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) not-
withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) [1971] ICJ Rep 16.
56 International Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination (1965), 660 UNTS 
195, entered into force 4 Jan. 1969.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ejil/article-abstract/24/3/867/481600 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 06 August 2019
Apartheid, International Law, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory 877
States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to pre-
vent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of  this nature in territories under their jurisdiction.
The general practice adopted by the drafters had been not to single out specific forms 
of  discrimination in the Convention. The express prohibition of  apartheid included 
in the treaty was an exception to allow for the fact that apartheid differed from other 
forms of  racial discrimination ‘in that it was the official policy of  a State Member of  
the United Nations’.57
Subsequent treaties of  international human rights law also made specific refer-
ence to apartheid. The Convention on the Elimination of  Discrimination Against 
Women,58 for instance, prescribes ‘the eradication of  apartheid, all forms of  racism, 
racial discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonialism, aggression, foreign occupation 
and domination’ as essential to the full enjoyment of  the rights of  men and women 
alike. Conventions prohibiting contact in certain fields with countries practising 
apartheid, such as the International Convention against Apartheid in Sports,59 were 
also adopted.
In 1971, in its advisory opinion on Namibia,60 the International Court of  Justice 
held that the policy of  apartheid as applied in Namibia was a ‘flagrant violation of  the 
purposes and principles of  the Charter’.61
B International Criminal Law
The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of  the Crime of  
Apartheid62 (the ‘Apartheid Convention’) was adopted subsequent to the initial prohi-
bition in international human rights law with the aim of  making it possible ‘to take 
more effective measures at the international and national levels with a view to the 
suppression and punishment of  the crime of  apartheid’. The Apartheid Convention 
is thus intended to complement the requirements of  Article 3 of  the International 
Convention for the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination, with its chapeau 
referring directly to Article 3. It goes beyond the prohibition of  apartheid by making 
it a criminal offence, declaring apartheid to be a crime against humanity which is 
subject to universal jurisdiction. The Convention accordingly obliges states parties to 
adopt legislative measures to suppress, discourage, and punish the crime of  apartheid.
The establishment of  apartheid as an international crime underlines the grav-
ity with which it is treated under international law and highlights the commitment 
57 UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1313, at para. 18. An additional reason stated for the exception was to counter the 
South African government’s claim that apartheid was not a form of  racial discrimination: ibid., at para. 
10.
58 Convention on the Elimination of  Discrimination Against Women (1979), 1249 UNTS 13, entered into 
force 3 Sept. 1981.
59 International Convention against Apartheid in Sports (1985), 1500 UNTS 161, entered into force 3 Apr. 
1988.
60 Namibia, supra note 55.
61 Ibid., at para 131.
62 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of  the Crime of  Apartheid (1973), 1015 UNTS 243, 
entered into force 18 July 1976.
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undertaken by the international community of  states to its eradication. The codifi-
cation of  the crime in the Apartheid Convention followed references to apartheid as 
a crime against humanity in various instruments of  soft law from the mid-1960s 
onwards.63 In 1968, Article 1 of  the Convention on the Non-Applicability of  Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity included among crimes 
against humanity ‘inhuman acts resulting from the policy of  apartheid’. The delinea-
tion of  apartheid as a crime against humanity was retained in the 1998 Rome Statute 
of  the International Criminal Court.64 Apartheid was also framed as a crime amount-
ing to a grave breach of  the Geneva Conventions when practised in the context of  an 
armed conflict, by virtue of  Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.65
C Public International Law
The resolutions of  the General Assembly pertaining to apartheid emphasized it as 
an inherent violation of  the right to self-determination, and accordingly consistently 
associated the rights of  those subject to a regime of  racial domination with the rights 
of  those subject to colonialism and foreign occupation. In 1970, for example, the 
General Assembly affirmed ‘the legitimacy of  the struggle of  peoples under colonial 
and alien domination recognized as being entitled to the right of  self-determination 
to restore to them that right by any means at their disposal’, and condemned ‘those 
Governments that deny the right to self-determination of  peoples recognized as being 
entitled to it, especially of  the peoples of  southern Africa and Palestine’.66 Such cou-
pling of  the Palestinian and South African causes was commonplace in resolutions 
during the 1970s.67 Perhaps even more significantly in terms of  apartheid policies 
constituting violations of  the right to self-determination, the General Assembly was 
forceful in its condemnation of  South Africa’s Bantustan model:
Considering that the establishment of  Bantustans and other measures adopted by the 
Government of  South Africa in pursuance of  apartheid are designed to consolidate and perpet-
uate domination by a white minority and the dispossession and exploitation of  the Africa and 
other non-white people of  South Africa as well as of  Namibia, [the General Assembly] again 
condemns the establishment of  Bantu homelands (Bantustans) and the forcible removal of  the 
African people of  South Africa and Namibia to those areas as a violation of  their inalienable 
rights, contrary to the principle of  self-determination and prejudicial to territorial integrity of  
the countries and the unity of  their peoples.68
The General Assembly similarly rejected South Africa’s subsequent endeavours to 
bestow independence upon certain Bantustan territories as ‘invalid’. Two days after 
63 See, e.g., GA Res. 2202 (XXI), 16 Dec. 1966, at para. 1; Proclamation of  Teheran, Final Act of  the 
International Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/CONF.32/41, 13 May 1968, at para. 7.
64 Art. 7(1)(j), Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court (1998), UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 2187 
UNTS 90, entered into force 1 July 2002.
65 Art. 85(4)(c), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of  Victims of  International Armed Conflicts (1977), 1125 UNTS 3, entered into force 7 Dec. 
1978.
66 GA Res. 2649 (XXV), 30 Nov. 1970.
67 See, e.g., GA Res. 3070 (XXVIII), 30 Nov. 1973.
68 GA Res. 2775 (XXVI), 29 Nov. 1971.
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the granting of  so-called independence to Transkei in 1976, a resolution was adopted 
by 130 votes to none denouncing ‘the establishment of  Bantustans as designed to 
consolidate the inhuman policies of  apartheid, to destroy the territorial integrity of  
the country, to perpetuate white minority domination and to dispossess the African 
people of  South Africa of  their inalienable rights’.69
The General Assembly’s call for non-recognition of  the severing of  the Transkei 
from South Africa was endorsed by the Security Council.70 This marked a shift towards 
a policy of  more pro-active engagement on apartheid by the Security Council. While 
it had adopted a number of  resolutions in the early 1960s deploring the apartheid 
regime’s racial policies, and recognizing the situation in South Africa as a disturbance 
to international peace and security, the Security Council limited itself  to requesting 
that the South African government cease its discriminatory practices, and to calling 
upon third states to cease the sale of  arms and military equipment to South Africa.71 
The weight that may have been felt by South Africa as a result of  these resolutions 
was diluted somewhat by frequent abstentions at the Security Council by France and 
the UK. From 1964 to 1972, as the noose of  apartheid continued to tighten in South 
Africa, the Security Council fell silent on the issue,72 and draft resolutions for the impo-
sition of  economic sanctions against South Africa and its expulsion from the UN were 
vetoed by the three Western permanent members. Following its call for non-recogni-
tion of  the independence of  the Transkei Bantustan73 and its condemnation of  South 
Africa’s violent response to the Soweto uprising in 1976,74 by 1977 the Security 
Council’s language had sharpened, now ‘strongly condemning’ South Africa’s racist 
regime, and ‘demanding’ the abandonment of  apartheid.75 Notably, these resolutions 
were now being adopted unanimously. In November 1977, the Security Council took 
another unanimous decision under Chapter VII of  the UN Charter to impose a man-
datory arms embargo on South Africa.76 This decision was followed up and recalled 
by subsequent resolutions in the years that followed,77 and when the South African 
government declared a state of  emergency in large parts of  the country in 1985, the 
Security Council called for the adoption of  sectoral economic boycotts and the suspen-
sion of  sports and cultural relations.78
69 GA Res. 31/6A (1976), 26 Oct. 1976.
70 SC Res. 402, 22 Dec. 1976; SC Res. 407, 25 May 1977. Similar denunciations came from the UN in 
response to the granting of  ‘independence’ to Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979, and Ciskei in 
1981.
71 See, inter alia, SC Res. 134, 1 Apr. 1960; SC Res. 181, 7 Aug. 1963; SC Res. 182, 4 Dec. 1963; SC Res. 
191, 18 June 1964.
72 It is noted that the SC did address the situation in Namibia during this period, condemning South Africa’s 
continuing occupation as illegal and criticizing the extension of  ‘the evil and abhorrent policies of  apart-
heid’ beyond South Africa’s borders: see SC Res. 264, 20 Mar. 1969; SC Res. 276, 30 Jan. 1970; SC Res. 
282, 23 July 1970.
73 SC Res. 402, 22 Dec. 1976; SC Res. 407, 25 May 1977.
74 SC Res. 392, 19 June 1976.
75 SC Res. 417, 31 Oct. 1977.
76 SC Res. 418, 4 Nov. 1977.
77 See, inter alia, SC Res. 421, 9 Dec. 1977; SC Res. 473, 13 June 1980; SC Res. 558, 13 Dec. 1984.
78 SC Res. 569, 26 July 1985 (with the UK and US abstaining).
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The Security Council’s sporadic engagement, which continued until the termina-
tion of  the arms embargo following South Africa’s transition to a democratic, non-
racial government in 1994,79 underscores the view taken by the international legal 
system of  apartheid as a threat to international peace and security, and the violence 
and repressive measures necessary to sustain it as contrary to international law. That 
apartheid is unlawful under the general rules of  public international law is reiterated 
by its listing alongside genocide and other crimes against humanity as an example of  
a breach of  an international obligation consisting of  a ‘composite wrongful act’ under 
Article 15 of  the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.80
D The Definition of  Apartheid
The above treaties of  international human rights law and criminal law provide the 
basis of  a working definition of  apartheid for the purpose of  considering Israel’s 
practices in the occupied Palestinian territory under the norm prohibiting apart-
heid. Reference to the apartheid practices of  South Africa is also made to provide 
an indication or clarification of  what the international community sought to 
prohibit through the treaties. The present study is concerned with appraising the 
responsibility of  the Israeli state under the norms of  public international law, as 
opposed to the responsibility of  its individual agents under international crimi-
nal law.81 Thus, reliance on the formulation of  criminal statutes – as among the 
most elaborate sources of  law on the question of  apartheid – is for the purposes 
of  informing a comprehensive definition rather than any evaluation of  individual 
criminal guilt.
The International Convention for the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial 
Discrimination defines racial discrimination, details a long list of  rights which all 
people are entitled to enjoy free from racial discrimination, and prohibits the practice 
of  apartheid as a particularly egregious form of  racial discrimination. Beyond that, 
however, the Convention does not define the practice of  apartheid with any precision. 
The Apartheid Convention and the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court 
provide further clarity on the definition of  apartheid. Article 2 of  the Apartheid 
Convention identifies a list of  inhuman acts which amount to apartheid if  they are:
committed for the purpose of  establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of  
persons over any other racial group of  persons and systematically oppressing them.
79 SC Res. 919, 25 May 1994.
80 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of  States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with commentaries’ (2001) II(2) Yrbk In’l L Comm 31, at 62. According to the commentary, ‘[s]ome 
of  the most serious wrongful acts in international law are defined in terms of  their composite character’.
81 An approach involving the ascertainment of  individual responsibility would require the discovery of  fac-
tual evidence to tie specific individuals to criminal offences arising under the rubric of  apartheid. This 
would be a later step in the process of  interrogating Israel’s policies and practices – if  state responsibility 
for a breach of  the prohibition of  apartheid is prima facie established, then individual criminal responsibil-
ity could arise consequentially.
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Article 7(2)(h) of  the Rome Statute similarly refers to apartheid as criminal acts
committed in the context of  an institutionalized regime of  systematic oppression and domina-
tion by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the inten-
tion of  maintaining that regime.
The essence of  the definition of  apartheid is thus the systematic, institutionalized, and 
oppressive character of  the discrimination involved, and the purpose of  domination 
that is entailed. It is this institutionalized element, involving a state-sanctioned regime 
of  law, policy, and institutions, that distinguishes the practice of  apartheid from other 
forms of  prohibited discrimination.
Article 2 of  the Apartheid Convention provides the most detailed list of  practices 
that are discrete human rights violations in themselves, but that may further amount 
to acts of  apartheid when committed in a systematic fashion for the purpose of  main-
taining domination by one racial group over another:
(a)  Denial to a member or members of  a racial group or groups of  the right to life and  
liberty of  person:
 (i) By murder of  members of  a racial group or groups;
 (ii)  By the infliction upon the members of  a racial group or groups of  serious bodily or 
mental harm, by the infringement of  their freedom or dignity, or by subjecting them 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
 (iii)  By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of  the members of  a racial group or groups;
 (b)  Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of  living conditions calculated to cause its 
or their physical destruction in whole or in part;
 (c)  Any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group or 
groups from participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of  the coun-
try and the deliberate creation of  conditions preventing the full development of  such a 
group or groups, in particular by denying to members of  a racial group or groups basic 
human rights and freedoms, including the right to work, the right to form recognized 
trade unions, the right to education, the right to leave and to return to their country, 
the right to a nationality, the right to freedom of  movement and residence, the right to 
freedom of  opinion and expression, and the right to freedom of  peaceful assembly and 
association;
 (d)  Any measures including legislative measures, designed to divide the population along 
racial lines by the creation of  separate reserves and ghettos for the members of  a racial 
group or groups, the prohibition of  mixed marriages among members of  various racial 
groups, the expropriation of  landed property belonging to a racial group or groups or to 
members thereof;
 (e)  Exploitation of  the labour of  the members of  a racial group or groups, in particular by 
submitting them to forced labour;
 (f)  Persecution of  organizations and persons, by depriving them of  fundamental rights and 
freedoms, because they oppose apartheid.
This complements and supplements the prohibited acts of  racial discrimina-
tion under Article 5 of  the International Convention for the Elimination of  All 
Forms of  Racial Discrimination (discrimination in the enjoyment of  the rights 
to inter alia: security of  person, nationality, education, work, formation of  rec-
ognized trade unions, freedom of  movement and residence, freedom of  opinion 
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and expression, freedom of  assembly and association) and the inhumane acts of  
apartheid envisaged by the Rome Statute (inter alia murder, deportation or forc-
ible transfer, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of  physical liberty, torture, 
persecution).
E The Status of  the Prohibition of  Apartheid
A crucial preliminary question in applying the definition of  apartheid to Israel’s 
occupation of  the West Bank and Gaza Strip relates to the status of  the prohibition 
of  apartheid under international law, given that Israel is not a party to two of  the 
key treaties in this regard – the Apartheid Convention and the Rome Statute. The 
customary status of  the prohibition of  apartheid is indicated by its location within 
general UN efforts aimed at the eradication of  all forms of  racial discrimination. 
As a particularly pernicious manifestation of  racial discrimination, the practice of  
apartheid is contrary to one of  the ostensible guiding principles of  international 
law – that of  respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinc-
tion as to race – as laid down in Article 55 of  the UN Charter and Article 2 of  the 
Universal Declaration of  Human Rights. The subsequent adoption of  international 
legal instruments explicitly proscribing and sanctioning apartheid testifies to a 
more concerted effort under international law to address the particular practice 
of  apartheid.
Although the majority of  states – including Israel – accept the general prohibition 
of  apartheid in the International Convention for the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial 
Discrimination and other treaties,82 fewer have ratified the Apartheid Convention,83 
primarily on account of  political contestations at the time of  its adoption over the 
appropriateness of  establishing universal jurisdiction for international crimes. The 
convention was seen by critics as seeking to ‘extend international criminal jurisdiction 
in a broad and ill-defined manner’.84 Western states such as Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US, amongst others, refrained from signing or 
ratifying the treaty for fear that their own citizens and corporations would have been 
exposed to prosecution for aiding and abetting apartheid.85 That said, a majority of  
states have ratified Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of  1949,86 and 
an ever-increasing number have become parties to the Rome Statute.87 There is no 
demonstrable hostility by non-states parties to the treaties to the provisions pertaining 
to apartheid, nor to the jurisdiction of  the International Criminal Court over the crime 
82 As of  30 Sept. 2011, there were 175 states parties to the International Convention for the Elimination 
of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination and 187 states parties to the Convention on the Elimination of  
Discrimination Against Women, demonstrating near-universal support and legal commitment to the 
elimination of  racial discrimination and the prohibition of  apartheid.
83 108 ratifications as of  19 Apr. 2012.
84 M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, and L. Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order (1980), at 545.
85 Zahar, ‘Apartheid as an International Crime’, in A. Cassesse, Oxford Companion to International Criminal 
Justice (2009), at 245.
86 173 states parties following South Sudan’s accession in Jan. 2013.
87 122 states parties following Côte d’Ivoire’s accession in Feb. 2013.
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of  apartheid, and several non-parties to the Apartheid Convention – including South 
Africa itself  – have ratified the later instruments.88 The movement of  the international 
crime of  apartheid towards customary status89 reinforces the fact that the prohibition 
itself  is established as a rule of  customary international law.
The prohibition of  apartheid can also be considered a norm of  jus cogens giving rise 
to obligations erga omnes. The International Law Commission views the prohibition of  
apartheid as a peremptory norm of  general international law and emphasizes that the 
practice of  apartheid amounts to ‘a serious breach on a widespread scale of  an inter-
national obligation of  essential importance for safeguarding the human being’.90 The 
Commission notes the ‘widespread agreement’ is shared by states as to the peremptory 
character of  the prohibition on apartheid, and that apartheid is ‘prohibited in widely 
ratified international treaties and conventions admitting of  no exception’.91
In its discussion of  obligations erga omnes in the Barcelona Traction case, the 
International Court of  Justice considered the prohibition of  racial discrimination a 
norm of  jus cogens, stating that obligations erga omnes would arise, for example, ‘from 
the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of  the human person, including 
protection from slavery and from racial discrimination’.92 With the prohibition of  
racial discrimination established as a rule of  jus cogens,93 it follows that the prohibition 
of  a particularly severe form of  racial discrimination – apartheid – must amount to a 
peremptory norm, entailing obligations erga omnes.
F Apartheid beyond Southern Africa: the Universality of  the 
Prohibition
Despite the comprehensive treatment of  apartheid by the international legal system, 
there remains a sense among many international lawyers that it was a sui generis 
regime, specific to South Africa, that has now been confined to the annals of  legal 
history. Alexandar Zahar, for instance, calls the existence of  the crime of  apartheid 
into question, partly on the basis of  apartheid having been eliminated in South 
Africa:
Considering the dubious legal history of  the so-called crime of  apartheid, as well as the demise 
of  South African apartheid in 1994, it is remarkable that in 1998 a homonymous offence was 
incorporated as a crime against humanity into the ICCSt (Art 7(1)(j)).94
Zahar concludes that ‘politics rather than legal engineering is behind the placement 
of  “apartheid” in the Statute’,95 without providing an explanation of  what – or whose 
– politics he is hinting at. It can only be assumed that he is suggesting that apartheid 
88 The UK being another prominent example.
89 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (2008), at 25.
90 International Law Commission, supra note 80, at 113.
91 Ibid., at 112.
92 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v. Spain), Limited Second Phase, 
Final Judgment [1970] ICJ Rep 3, at 32, paras 33–34.
93 See, e.g., United States (Third) Restatement of  the Foreign Relations Law (1986), Section 702, note 11.
94 Zahar, supra note 85, at 246.
95 Ibid.
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was retained in the Rome Statute merely as a token measure to placate the nations 
of  the global South, for whom apartheid had been an important rallying call around 
which to make their presence felt in the international legal system following emanci-
pation from European colonial rule. The Apartheid Convention has 108 states parties, 
predominantly from the global South, in comparison to the near-universal ratification 
of  the Convention on the Rights of  the Child.96 There have been only six new states 
parties to the Apartheid Convention since 1994,97 and post-apartheid South Africa 
itself  has not ratified the Convention. As we noted at the outset, the treaty-monitor-
ing body for the Apartheid Convention was suspended in 1995, and both the Special 
Committee against Apartheid and the UN Centre Against Apartheid dissolved.98 
On these grounds the relevance of  the international legal prohibition on apartheid 
beyond South African history is disputed from certain quarters.
Such contestations are easily refuted with reference to the universally applicable 
nature of  international human rights treaties, as well as to the specifics of  the prohi-
bition of  apartheid. The Apartheid Convention makes reference to ‘southern Africa’, 
reflecting the fact that the history of  apartheid relates to a larger swathe of  the 
southern part of  the African continent than just South Africa. Moreover, while the 
Convention may have been drafted with prevailing circumstances in southern Africa 
in mind, it was not intended to be confined to those circumstances.99 Apartheid is 
described as policies of  racial segregation and discrimination similar to those practised 
in southern Africa, indicating that its prohibition is applicable beyond that region. 
Roger Clark notes that ‘the Convention is drafted in such a way as not to apply solely 
to the South African case, although South Africa is mentioned as an example’.100 
Such an interpretation is supported by reference to the travaux préparatoires. During 
the drafting process, state representatives envisaged that the terms of  the Apartheid 
Convention would apply beyond the geographical limits of  southern Africa.101 The 
delegate of  Cyprus, for example, stated, ‘When drafting and adopting such an inter-
national convention, it must be remembered that it would become part of  the body of  
96 Montenegro became the Convention’s 193rd state party in Oct. 2006.
97 Serbia, Guatemala, Honduras, Moldova, Montenegro, and Uruguay.
98 Report of  the Group of  Three, supra note 2, at paras 20, 12.
99 See, e.g., I. Bantekas and S. Nash, International Criminal Law (2nd edn, 2003), at 121–122. See also J.S. 
Morton, The International Law Commission of  the United Nations (2000), at 27: ‘apartheid was declared to 
be a crime against humanity, with a scope that went far beyond South Africa. While the crime of  apart-
heid is most often associated with the racist policies of  South Africa after 1947, the term more generally 
refers to racially based policies in any state.’
100 Clark, ‘Apartheid’, in M. Cherif  Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, Volume 1: Crimes (1999), at 
643–644. See also Dugard in H. Ascensio, E. Decaux, and A. Pellet (eds), Droit international pénal (2nd 
edn, 2012), at 197.
101 See, e.g., statement by Mr. Wiggins (USA), UN GA, Official Records, 28th Session, 1973, 3rd and 4th 
Committees, 2003rd meeting, 22 Oct. 1973, Agenda Item 53, Draft Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of  the Crime of  Apartheid, UN Docs. A/9003 and Corr.1, chaps XXIII, sect. A.2; A/9095 and 
Add.1, at 142, para. 36: ‘Article I would be open to very broad interpretations going beyond both the 
intentions of  its drafters and the geographical limits of  southern Africa’: statement by Mr. Petherbridge 
(Australia) at 143, para. 4: ‘the concept of  apartheid was being widened to such an extent that it could 
be applicable to areas other than South Africa’.
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international law and might last beyond the time when apartheid was being practiced 
in South Africa’.102
The prohibition of  apartheid is also more widely embedded in international law than 
solely with reference to the Apartheid Convention. The Committee on the Elimination 
of  Racial Discrimination has confirmed the universal application of  Article 3 of  the 
International Convention on the Elimination of  all forms of  Racial Discrimination, 
which ‘prohibits all forms of  racial segregation in all countries’.103 The retention of  
apartheid as an international crime in the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal 
Court, negotiated and adopted subsequent to the fall of  the apartheid regime in South 
Africa, is further evidence of  the continuing applicability of  the prohibition ‘to other 
situations in which discriminatory racial practices entailing a dual structure of  rights 
and duties are imposed by prevailing law on a subordinated people’.104
5 Apartheid in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
Based on the legal content of  apartheid as discussed in the previous section, with 
Article 2 of  the Apartheid Convention as a primary guiding compass, Israeli law and 
practice in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip can be appraised. 
Such an appraisal must have reference to the purpose for which acts of  apartheid are 
practised according to the terms of  the chapeau of  Article 2, and the associated list of  
‘inhuman acts’. For such inhuman acts to amount to apartheid they must be commit-
ted systematically, for the purpose of  establishing and maintaining domination by one 
racial group of  persons over any other racial group or groups.105 The crucial prelim-
inary question to be addressed therefore is whether Jews and Palestinians constitute 
distinct ‘racial groups’ for the purposes of  the definition of  apartheid. If  so, we must 
then ascertain whether prohibited inhuman acts are being perpetrated against one 
racial group, and whether in the context of  an institutionalized system of  domination.
A Racial Groups
Answering the above question entails obvious sensitivities and controversies in the 
light of  the experiences of  both Jews and Arabs in historic Palestine. The situation in 
the occupied territories is not as clearly defined in terms of  traditional conceptions 
of  ‘race’ as was the case in apartheid South Africa.106 The idea of  race itself  has long 
been shown as social construct rather than scientific reality, with a process of  ‘racial-
ization’ entailing the social utilization of  the concept of  race as a biological category 
in order to organize and distort perceptions of  the world’s various populations.107 The 
102 Statement by Mr. Papademas (Cyprus), ibid., at 142–143, para. 39.
103 UN Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination, ‘General Recommendation XIX: Racial seg-
regation and apartheid (Art. 3)’, UN Doc. A/50/18, 18 Aug. 1995, at para. 1.
104 Falk, supra note 21, at para. 5.
105 Art. 2 of  the Apartheid Convention and Art. 7(2)(h) of  the Rome Statute are consistent on this point.
106 See notes 31–35 above.
107 M. Banton, The Idea of  Race (1977).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ejil/article-abstract/24/3/867/481600 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 06 August 2019
886 EJIL 24 (2013), 867–913
evolutive denotations and usages of  the term ‘race’ in history bear noting. Where 
‘race’ once comprised a synonym for ‘people’ or ‘nation’, western thinking on race 
shifted as European imperialism unfurled itself  around the globe.108 Earlier cultural 
and territorial conceptions of  race as implying nationality or tribe membership ceded 
ground by the 19th century to a scientific discourse that framed race in genetic, bio-
logical, and physically observable terms, giving rise to the fields of  ‘social Darwinism’ 
and ‘scientific racialism’. This in turn has since come to be seen as ‘a pseudo-scientific 
way to categorise the human species’ that was discredited by the mid-20th century, 
since which time race has been understood as signifying socially constructed identities 
in a given local setting, with the term ‘race’ falling out of  technical usage except in the 
context of  racial discrimination.109
For these reasons, and with our appraisal of  apartheid being conducted in the 
legal context, it is both appropriate and necessary for us to turn to international law 
for guidance. Simply put, international human rights law allows wider scope for 
the meaning of  race or racial group than observable ‘black vs. white’ binaries. The 
Charter of  the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights, and the 
International Convention for the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination all 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of  race. They are equally consistent in their failure 
to define the content of  race itself. The Convention for the Elimination of  All Forms 
of  Racial Discrimination does, however, give broad construction to the meaning of  
‘racial’ in the context of  ‘racial discrimination’. A wide-ranging spectrum of  group 
categories is encompassed in the prohibition of  discrimination, with Article 1(1) of  
the Convention listing race among several other group identities that can amount to a 
basis for racial discrimination:
the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of  
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of  human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field 
of  public life.
The International Convention for the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination 
can thus be interpreted as including descent or national or ethnic origin within the 
meaning of  the term ‘racial’; categories that Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians may 
be classified by, even if  not clearly discernible under the more ambiguous indicators 
of  race or colour.
The preamble to the Apartheid Convention invokes the International Convention for 
the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination and holds apartheid as includ-
ing ‘similar policies and practices of  racial segregation and discrimination as prac-
tised in southern Africa’. This reference provides grounds to interpret the Apartheid 
Convention as applying to a system of  institutionalized domination and oppression 
by one racial group over another in the broad sense conveyed by the International 
108 See, e.g., C.  Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race (1971); Drescher, ‘The Ending of  the Slave Trade and the 
Evolution of  European Scientific Racism’, 14(3) Social Science History (1990) 415.
109 Tilley (ed.), supra note 19, at 109–111.
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Convention for the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination, and that a 
‘racial group’ in the context of  apartheid need not be limited to a narrow construction 
of  race. In interpreting and applying the Convention in practice, the Committee on the 
Elimination of  Racial Discrimination has incorporated groups that may not sit within 
traditional conceptions of  ‘race’, including non-citizen groups such as migrant work-
ers, ethno-cultural groups such as particular nomadic tribes, and descent-based caste 
groups in India.110
In their adjudication of  matters of  genocide and persecution, the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia were faced with the inher-
ent difficulty of  determining group identities within the context of  the elements of  the 
crimes concerned. The jurisprudence concludes that no clear scientific or impartial 
method exists for determining whether any group is a racial group, and that the ques-
tion rests to a large extent on local perceptions. Even racial classifications inscribed on 
identity documents – particularly apposite in the Rwandan context – were found not 
to be conclusively determinate in all cases.
In its seminal Akayesu decision, the Rwanda tribunal set out criteria for determina-
tions of  national, ethnic, racial, or religious identities, which, following the Genocide 
Convention, were listed in Article 2 of  the tribunal’s founding statute as the four 
groups against whom genocide might be perpetrated. The trial judgment found a 
national group to be ‘a collection of  people who are perceived to share a legal bond 
based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of  rights and duties’. An eth-
nic group is one ‘whose members share a common language and culture’, while ‘[t]he 
conventional definition of  racial group is based on the hereditary physical traits often 
identified with a geographical region, irrespective of  linguistic, cultural, national 
or religious factors’. A  religious group was defined as ‘one whose members share 
the same religion, denomination or mode of  worship’.111 The tribunal subsequently 
explained that the various group conceptions ‘partially overlap’112 and should be con-
sidered ‘on a case-by-case basis’, with each ‘assessed in the light of  a particular politi-
cal, social and cultural context’.113
The ad hoc tribunals recognized the difficulty of  externally determining any of  these 
categories with reliability and consistency. Rather, local perceptions of  group identities 
110 See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination, ‘Concluding Observations: India’, UN 
Doc. CERD/C/IND/CO/19, 5 May 2007, at para. 8.
111 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 2 Sept. 1998, at paras 512–515.
112 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, Trial Judgment, 2 Aug. 2001, at para. 555. The overlap between 
ethnic and racial groups (as well, perhaps, as discomfort over the continuing use of  the language of  
‘race’), for example, had been tacitly acknowledged as far back as 1950 when the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of  Discrimination and Protection of  Minorities resolved to replace ‘racial’ with ‘ethnic’ in all 
references to minority groups described by their ethnic origin. See F. Capotorti, Study on the Rights of  the 
Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (Sales 
No. E.78XIV.1, 1979), at para. 197. State practice in many instances can also be found to reveal overlaps 
between various group categories. The census system in the US, for instance, treats ‘race’ and ‘national 
origin’ as a single category, established by self-identification as opposed to external determinations. See 
Tilley (ed.), supra note 19, at 114, n. 19.
113 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Trial Judgment, 6 Dec. 1999, at paras 57, 55.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ejil/article-abstract/24/3/867/481600 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 06 August 2019
888 EJIL 24 (2013), 867–913
were held to be a conclusive factor in ascertaining protected groups. Even where racial 
or group specifications are assigned in legislation or identity cards, the jurisprudence 
from the Rwanda tribunal demonstrates that of  principal significance is whether the 
victims are considered by the perpetrator, or consider themselves, as belonging to one 
of  the protected groups.114 The Trial Chamber of  the Yugoslavia tribunal summarized 
its sister institution’s precedent as follows:
In accordance with the case-law of  the Tribunal, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group 
is identified by using as a criterion the stigmatisation of  the group, notably by the perpetrators 
of  the crime, on the basis of  its perceived national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics.115
In Jelisic, the court affirmed that attempting to define a racial group using objective 
and scientifically irreproachable criteria would be ‘a perilous exercise whose result 
would not necessarily correspond to the perception of  the persons concerned by such 
categorisation’ and found it more appropriate to evaluate group status ‘from the view 
of  those persons who wish to single that group out from the rest of  the community’.116
The weight given by tribunal jurisprudence to the subjective element of  determina-
tions of  racial groups is consonant with a general recommendation that had been 
issued by the UN Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination in 1990, 
endorsing self-identification as a valid basis for verification of  membership of  a 
racial group:
The Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination,
Having considered reports from States parties concerning information about the ways in 
which individuals are identified as being members of  a particular racial or ethnic groups or 
groups,
Is of  the opinion that such identification shall, if  no justification exists to the contrary, be 
based upon self-identification by the individual concerned.117
With regard to all of  the relevant group identities, the body of  jurisprudence on the 
Rwandan genocide further emphasizes the ‘stable and permanent’ constitution of  
the protected group, holding that group membership is typically acquired by birth, 
114 See ibid., at para. 55: ‘membership of  a group is, in essence, a subjective rather than an objective concept. 
The victim is perceived by the perpetrator of  genocide as belonging to a group slated for destruction. In 
some instances, the victim may perceive himself/herself  as belonging to the said group.’
115 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, 17 Jan. 2005, at para. 667 (empha-
sis added).
116 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, Trial Judgment, 14 Dec. 1999, at para. 70.
117 UN Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination General Recommendation VIII, ‘Identification 
with a particular racial or ethnic group’, UN Doc. A/45/18, 22 Aug. 1990. Analogous examinations 
of  the broader category of  ‘peoples’ under public international law have also resulted in similar weight 
being given to the subjective element of  group identification. In Gunme v.  Cameroon, for instance, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights provided a broad reading of  the meaning of  the 
term ‘people’ in holding that the people of  Southern Cameroon qualify as such, ‘because they manifest 
numerous characteristics and affinities, which include a common history, linguistic tradition, territorial 
connection, and political outlook. More importantly they identify themselves as a people with a separate 
and distinct identity. Identity is an innate characteristic within a people. It is up to other external people 
to recognise such existence, but not to deny it’: Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al. v. Cameroon, ACHPR, Comm. 
No. 266/2003, 27 May 2009, at para. 179.
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retained throughout life, and ‘normally not challengeable by its members, who belong 
to it automatically’.118 Group identities under the International Convention for the 
Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination are similarly understood as gener-
ally immutable, with the intrinsic nature of  group membership emerging as ‘the com-
mon denominator of  identities based on race, colour, descent, and national and ethnic 
origin: that is, the groups cited by ICERD as being targets of  racial discrimination’.119
No uniform or universal criteria exist for distinguishing different group identi-
ties from one another, with the labels often interchangeable and subject to political 
manipulation and cultural variations.120 For the purposes of  applying the definition 
of  apartheid in international law, therefore, assessment must be made of  whether 
Jews and Palestinians comprise distinct racial groups in their localized relation to one 
another, in the broad sense of  the term under international law. Of  critical importance 
is whether they can be identified as groups whose membership is generally understood 
as fixed and incontestable from acquisition at birth, and which are entwined in a rela-
tionship of  domination. Such an interpretation is compatible with contemporary race 
theory that now sees racial discrimination as the product of  a process of  ‘racial for-
mation’, whereby a dominant group constructs a subordinate population as racially 
distinct in order to ensure its political and/or economic marginalization.121 In essence, 
the question of  racial groups is a sociological rather than a biological one.
The formation and evolution of  Jewish and Palestinian identities are remarkably 
complex, and we by no means intend nor purport to expound them in all of  their 
socio-historical and cultural complexity here. For the purposes of  applying the defini-
tion of  apartheid to the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, however, the 
interpretation of  racial groups as developed in international law appears sufficiently 
broad to understand Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs as distinct groups. Jewish 
and Palestinian identities, while not typically seen as ‘races’ in the old (discredited) 
sense of  biological or skin colour categories, are constructed as groups distinguished 
by ancestry or descent as well as ethnicity, nationality, and religion. As such they are 
distinguished from each other in a number of  forms within the parameters of  racial 
discrimination under international human rights law.
While being Jewish clearly connotes a religious identity, this provides only a partial 
account. There is significant but by no means complete overlap between ‘Jewish’ in 
the sense of  those who practise the religion of  Judaism, and ‘Jewish’ in the sense of  
the ancient Israelites and their descendants.122 Religious law and social norms provide 
that Jewish identity is primarily descent-based, conveyed from mother to child. This 
aspect of  Jewishness is codified in Israel’s Law of  Return: ‘[f]or the purposes of  this 
118 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 111, at para. 511.
119 Tilley (ed.), supra note 19, at 114.
120 This was borne out by South Africa’s experience in implementing its race classification laws. Great hard-
ships resulted from classifying people of  mixed descent. In many instances, members of  the same family 
were classified as belonging to different racial groups.
121 See, e.g., M. Omi and H. Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (1994); 
P. Spickard (ed.), Race and Nation: Ethnic Systems in the Modern World (2005).
122 See further Nusseibeh, ‘Why Israel can’t be a “Jewish State”’, Al-Jazeera, 30 Sept. 2011.
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Law, “Jew” means a person who was born of  a Jewish mother’. Significantly, being 
Jewish is not considered a religious identity by those who acquire Jewish identity at 
birth but who do not to adhere to the religious faith. They consider themselves ‘secu-
lar’ Jews and are seen as Jewish solely on the basis of  their Jewish ancestry. In this 
sphere of  descent, the idea of  ‘race’ also persists, the legacy of  a Zionism that tradition-
ally framed Jews and Jewish interests in Palestine in ethno-racial terms. The Jewish 
National Fund, an organization exercising state-like functions in Israel, includes in 
its incorporating articles the aim to ‘benefit, directly or indirectly, those of  Jewish race 
or descendancy’.123 The Zionist movement had also framed Jews as a people with the 
right to self-determination over a particular territory; that is, a nation. Such a concept 
of  Jewish nationality is also inscribed in Israel’s laws and in the founding charters of  
state agencies and ‘parastatal’ organizations such as the World Zionist Organization, 
the Jewish Agency for the Land of  Israel, and the Jewish National Fund. The official 
denomination of  Israel as a ‘Jewish state’ and insistence on its recognition as such 
are themselves inherently premised on the idea of  a distinct group that the state is 
designed to privilege.124 Thus, while Jewish identity may be based in some contexts on 
religion, Jews can also be understood as a group based on descent and/or ethnic or 
national origin.
Palestinians, for their part, are a group defined primarily by national origin, based 
on family roots in historic Palestine, distinguishable from the broader Arab ‘nation’ 
of  which it forms a part by reference to specific local customs and a strong affinity 
to the common homeland.125 Vis-à-vis Jewish Israelis, the Palestinians emerge as a 
separate group by virtue of  ethnic indicators including a distinct language and cul-
ture, as well as claims to self-determination and indigeneity in territory occupied by 
Israel. Palestinians are of  mixed religious composition, and thus religion itself  is not a 
defining feature of  Palestinian identity, although it does impact directly upon identity 
politics in the region insofar as Israel excludes and discriminates against Palestinians 
on the basis of  a constructed ‘non-Jewish’ identity.
Identity distinctions within Israeli jurisdiction are rooted not merely in social prac-
tice but in the laws and practice of  the state and its institutions:
Under Israeli law and policy, group membership is an official category imposed and monitored 
by the state, not simply a voluntary identity. Israeli Jews are a group unified by law, sharing 
the same legal status wherever they reside, while Palestinian Arabs are a separate group, sub-
divided into citizens, occupied residents (whose residence rights may be lost if  they leave the 
territory in which they live), and refugees who do not have the right to return to any part of  
historic Palestine.126
As noted, an appraisal of  whether distinct racial groups exist must include consider-
ation of  whether two groups can be shown to hold separate identities acquired at birth 
123 Jewish National Fund, Memorandum of  Association, Art. 3(c).
124 As Sari Nusseibeh points out, ‘recognition of  Israel as a “Jewish state” implies that Israel is, or should be, 
either a theocracy (if  we take the word “Jewish” to apply to the religion of  Judaism) or an apartheid state 
(if  we take the word “Jewish” to apply to the ethnicity of  Jews), or both’: Nusseibeh, supra note 122.
125 See, e.g., R. Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of  Modern National Consciousness (1997).
126 Russell Tribunal on Palestine, supra note 26, at para. 5.19.
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that are generally immutable. In the context of  Israel/Palestine, there are sufficient 
grounds to conclude that Jews and Palestinians are constructed and perceived both by 
themselves and by external actors as stable and permanent groups distinct from each 
other, and therefore can be considered as different racial groups for the purposes of  the 
definition of  apartheid.
B Inhuman Acts
A forensic examination of  Israeli law and practice in the Palestinian territories is nec-
essary in order to ascertain the extent to which the many ‘inhuman acts’ specified in 
Article 2 of  the Apartheid Convention are being committed. Evidence of  violations of  
Palestinian rights has been extensively documented by human rights organizations 
and UN monitoring bodies, and is readily available. It is not our intention to replicate 
such documentation in detail here; rather to provide an overview and emphasize that 
the cumulative effect of  such consistent and wide-ranging violations is such that they 
not only amount to individual breaches of  international human rights and humani-
tarian law when taken in isolation, but are sufficiently extensive and wide-ranging as 
to amount to a form of  systematic domination within the meaning of  apartheid.
The available evidence suggests that Israel is responsible for committing inhuman 
acts within the meaning of  Article 2(a), (c), (d), and (f) of  the Apartheid Convention, 
while it does not suggest Israeli culpability for the inhuman acts described by Article 
2(b) and (e) of  the Convention.
Article 2(a) relates to the denial to a member or members of  a racial group of  the 
right to life and liberty of  person. Israel’s policies and practices in the West Bank include 
denial of  the right to life through state-sanctioned extra-judicial killings of  Palestinians 
opposed to the occupation, including the targeting of  political leaders and militants 
at times when they were not participating in hostilities and were thus protected by 
international humanitarian law.127 To aggravate matters, such targeted killings have 
often resulted in the killing of  innocent bystanders as ‘collateral damage’.128 The Israeli 
Supreme Court has placed restraints on this practice short of  declaring it unlawful,129 
but it continues unabated. In many cases the killing of  Palestinian militants consti-
tutes the extra-judicial killing of  persons who could be arrested and brought to trial 
rather than summarily executed. South Africa’s apartheid security forces on occasion 
killed political opponents in an arbitrary and secretive manner,130 but in most instances 
127 Official Israeli policy on targeted killings was altered following the outbreak of  the second inti-
fada in Sept. 2000, with the political establishment giving the military ‘a broader license to 
li quidate Palestinian terrorists’, allowing the army ‘to act against known terrorists even if  they are 
not on the verge of  committing a major attack’: Harel and Benn, ‘Kitchen cabinet okays expan-
sion of  liquidation list’, Ha’aretz, 4 July 2001, available at: www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/
kitchen-cabinet-okays-expansion-of-liquidation-list-1.64082.
128 The killing of  14 civilians, including 9 children, in the operation to assassinate Hamas military leader 
Salah Shehadeh is one prominent example. See Weill, ‘The Targeted Killing of  Salah Shehadeh: From 
Gaza to Madrid’, 7 J Int’l Criminal Justice (2009) 617.
129 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of  Israel et al., HCJ 769/02, 13 Dec. 2006.
130 See P. Harris, In a Different Time: The Inside Story of  the Delmas Four (2008).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ejil/article-abstract/24/3/867/481600 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 06 August 2019
892 EJIL 24 (2013), 867–913
they preferred to bring such persons to trial. This was because treason and terrorism 
were capital crimes in a country that then practised the death penalty. Arguably, South 
Africa’s judicially approved execution of  militants was more forthright than Israel’s 
extrajudicial executions, which allow militants to be killed while at the same time 
allowing Israel to proclaim proudly that it does not practise the death penalty. Certainly 
apartheid South Africa did not practise systematic extrajudicial killings openly and with 
the public authorization of  senior security and political officials as is done by Israel.
The right to life is also violated by Israel in the course of  the Israeli military’s regular 
raids into Palestinian territory during which militants and innocent civilians are often 
killed. Excessive and disproportionate force against civilian demonstrators, frequently 
resulting in death, is an unexceptional occurrence in Palestine.131 Such killings appear 
to form part of  a broader policy aimed at suppressing opposition to the occupation. 
The apartheid regime in South Africa likewise showed little regard for human life in 
the suppression of  dissent of  this kind.
The denial of  liberty of  person is similarly prevalent. Since the beginning of  its mil-
itary occupation, Israeli policy has involved the arrest and detention of  Palestinians 
on a mass scale. One count puts the number of  Palestinians imprisoned at some 
time since 1967 at over 650,000, close to 40 per cent of  the male population.132 
The torture and ill-treatment of  Palestinian detainees during that time has been well 
documented.133 The absolute prohibition on torture in international law has not 
been incorporated into domestic Israeli law,134 and while Israel’s Supreme Court in 
1999 held ‘brutal or inhuman means’ of  interrogation deployed by the security ser-
vices to be unlawful, it allowed for a defence of  ‘necessity’ and effectively sanctioned 
the continued use of  pressure and discomfort for the purpose of  extracting infor-
mation from ‘security’ prisoners.135 The overwhelming majority of  such detainees 
are Palestinians: according to the Israel Prison Service, from a total 9,498 security 
prisoners incarcerated in Israel in 2006, only 12 were Jewish Israelis.136 In contrast 
131 See, e.g., B’Tselem, ‘Soldier kills Palestinian demonstrator Mustafa Tamimi, 28, by shooting tear-gas 
canister at him’, 11 Dec. 2011, available at: www.btselem.org/firearms/20111209_killing_of_mustafa_
tamimi; Al-Haq, ‘Right To Life of  Palestinian Children Disregarded in Ni’lin as Israel’s Policy of  Wilful 
Killing of  Civilians Continues’, 7 Aug. 2008, available at: www.alhaq.org/10yrs/advocacy/628-right-to-
life-of-palestinian-children-disregarded-in-nilin-as-israels-policy-of-wilful-killing-of-civilians-continues.
132 Addameer, Prisoners’ Support and Human Rights Association, ‘Political Detention’, available at: www.
addameer.org/detention/background.html.
133 See, e.g., B’Tselem and Hamoked, Absolute Prohibition: The Torture and Ill-treatment of  Palestinian Detainees 
(2007); Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, Ticking Bombs: Testimonies of  Torture Victims in Israel 
(2007). The UN Committee Against Torture has expressed concern that from over 600 complaints of  ill-
treatment by the Israel Security Agency (ISA) received by the Inspector of  Complaints (an ISA employee) 
between 2001 and 2008, not a single criminal investigation has resulted, while ‘out of  550 examinations 
of  torture allegations initiated by the General Security Services (GSS) inspector between 2002 and 2007, 
only four resulted in disciplinary measures and none in prosecution’: UN Committee Against Torture, 
‘Concluding Observations of  the Committee Against Torture: Israel’, UN Doc. CAT/C/ISR/CO/4, 14 May 
2009, at para. 21.
134 Ibid., at para. 13.
135 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The Government of  Israel, H.C. 5100/94, 53(4) PD 81.
136 Letter from the Israel Prison Service to Adalah, 6 Nov. 2006.
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to the ill-treatment to which Palestinians are routinely subject while incarcerated, 
Jewish Israeli detainees classified as security prisoners have been granted privileges 
including conjugal visits.
Arbitrary arrest and detention, including ‘administrative detention’ imposed 
without charge or trial, has been a prominent feature of  the occupation, particularly 
during the Palestinian intifadas.137 Under the Israeli military regime in the occupied 
Palestinian territory, executive power is vested in the armed forces, giving military 
commanders authority to issue detention orders. Israel bases such authority on the 
British Mandate Government of  Palestine’s Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, 
augmented by a series of  military orders imposed from 1967 onwards. Such mil-
itary legislation is implemented by a military court system which appears incom-
patible with fundamental international standards regarding due process and the 
administration of  justice,138 and which since 1967 has served as a tool of  mass 
and often arbitrary detention of  Palestinians. This persists in the West Bank, where 
military courts continue to convict Palestinian civilians – including children139 – en 
masse, and military orders continue to authorize local commanders to issue orders 
137 By way of  example, over 50,000 Palestinians were arrested during the height of  the first intifada between 
Dec. 1987 and Dec. 1989, of  whom more than 10,000 were placed under administrative detention: 
Al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege (1990), at 285.
138 See, e.g., L. Hajjar, Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza (2005); 
Cavanaugh, ‘The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza’, 12 J Conflict and Security 
L (2007) 197; Yesh Din, Backyard Proceedings: The Implementation of  Due Process Rights in the Military 
Courts in the Occupied Territories (2007). In his 2007 Mission report on Israel and the occupied Palestinian 
territory, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of  human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, reported that the military courts ‘have an 
appearance of  a potential lack of  independence and impartiality, which on its own brings into question 
the fairness of  trials’: see M. Scheinin, ‘Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of  human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Addendum: Mission to Israel, 
including visit to the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, UN Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.4, 16 Nov. 2007, at 
para. 29.
139 The principal piece of  relevant legislation for the prosecution of  minors is Military Order No. 132, 
Order Concerning Adjudication of  Juvenile Offenders, 24 Sept. 1967, which until Oct. 2011 defined 
Palestinians as minors only up to the age of  15, with those aged 16–17 legally defined by Israel as 
adults (whereas in Israel the age for an individual legally to qualify as an adult was 18). Although that 
anomaly has been corrected with the definition of  a Palestinian minor now extended up to 17 years 
of  age, others remain. A Palestinian must be aged 11 or under to be defined as a child under Military 
Order No. 132, meaning that Palestinian minors aged 12 upwards are treated under the same proce-
dures as adults in the military legal system. Consequently, Palestinians from the age of  12 are subject 
to prosecution under Israeli military legislation, including Military Order No. 378, under which they 
face, e.g., sentences of  up to 10 years’ imprisonment for throwing a stone at a stationary object such as 
the wall, and 20 years for throwing a stone at a moving vehicle. In the Israeli civil court system applic-
able to Jewish settlers, by contrast, children under the age of  14 cannot be subject to prison sentences. 
The discrepancy over the affording of  the same treatment and punishment for Palestinian juveniles as 
adults has repeatedly been raised as a matter of  concern by the UN Committee Against Torture as well 
as by the Committee on the Rights of  the Child: see, e.g., UN Committee Against Torture, ‘Conclusions 
and Recommendations: Israel’, 25 Sept. 2002, UN Doc. A/57/44, at para. D(6)(d); ‘Concluding 
Observations of  the Committee on the Rights of  the Child: Israel’, 9 Oct. 2002, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/
Add. 195, Art. 62(a).
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detaining individuals for up to six months without charge or trial (renewable).140 
While the Gaza Strip arguably remains under belligerent occupation,141 Israel pre-
sented its unilateral disengagement in 2005 as serving to ‘dispel claims regarding 
Israel’s responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip’.142 The jurisdiction of  
Israeli military orders in Gaza was thus repealed. This has not, however, resulted in 
the transfer of  full authority over the administration of  justice in Gaza from Israel to 
the Palestinians. Israel instead enacted specific legislation in the form of  the 2006 
Criminal Procedure Law143 to allow it to incarcerate ‘security suspects’ – primarily 
Palestinians from the Gaza Strip – in detention facilities in Israel, and to prosecute 
them in Israeli civil courts. This statute appears to have been born from a desire to 
retain direct control over aspects of  the administration of  justice in Gaza, and has 
been applied almost exclusively against Gazans.144 According to estimates submitted 
to the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee by the head of  the investiga-
tions unit of  the Israeli General Security Services (GSS) concerning the applicability 
of  the law, ‘[o]ver 90% of  detainees (to which this law was applied) were from the 
Gaza Strip’.145 While a provision of  the 2006 law that allowed the pre-trial detention 
of  security suspects to be extended in absentia was struck down in February 2010 
by Israel’s Supreme Court, new legislation was promptly introduced in the form of  
the 2010 Criminal Procedure Law146 to bypass the Supreme Court ruling and fur-
ther remove procedural safeguards from detainees.147 The 2010 law in practice again 
applies mainly to detainees from Gaza.
140 The primary military legislation relating to administrative detention is Military Order No. 378, Order 
Concerning Security Provisions, 20 Apr. 1970, as amended, most significantly by Military Order No. 
1229, Order Concerning Administrative Detention (Provisional Regulations), 17 Mar. 1988. Other mili-
tary orders have been enacted in specific contexts as they have arisen. Military Order No. 1500, e.g., 
was issued in Apr. 2002 to provide for mass detention of  Palestinians during Israel’s sweeping military 
incursions in the West Bank. This order gave every Israeli soldier in the territory the authority to arrest 
Palestinians without providing a reason and without requiring authorization from a superior officer. It 
also allowed the occupying forces to detain Palestinians for 18 days without bringing them before a judge.
141 See, e.g., UN SC Res. 1860, UN Doc. S/RES/1860, 8 Jan. 2009; UN GA Res. 63/96, UN Doc. A/RES/63/96, 
18 Dec. 2008; UN Human Rights Council Res. S-9/1 UN Doc. A/HRC/S-9/L.1, 12 Jan. 2009; ‘Report 
of  the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ (the ‘Goldstone Report’), UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, 
15 Sept. 2009, at para. 276. For further discussion see Darcy and Reynolds, ‘An Enduring Occupation: 
The Status of  the Gaza Strip from the Perspective of  International Humanitarian Law’, 15 J Conflict and 
Security L (2010) 211; Scobbie, ‘An Intimate Disengagement: Israel’s Withdrawal from Gaza, the Law of  
Occupation and of  Self-Determination’, 11 Yrbk Islamic and Middle Eastern L (2004–2005) 3; cf. Shany, 
‘Faraway, so Close: The Legal Status of  Gaza after Israel’s Disengagement’, 8 Yrbk Int’l Humanitarian L 
(2005) 369.
142 Israeli Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, The Disengagement Plan – General Outline, 18 Apr. 2004, Art. 1(vi); 
Revised Disengagement Plan, 6 June 2004, Art. 1(vi).
143 Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers – Detention) (Detainees Suspected of  Security Offences) 
(Temporary Provision) Law 2006.
144 Darcy and Reynolds, supra note 141, at 236.
145 Quoted in Report of  the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, supra note 141, at 
para. 1443.
146 Criminal Procedure Law (Suspects of  Security Offenses) (Temporary Order) (Amendment No. 2) 2010.
147 See Israel Democracy Institute, ‘Knesset Extends Temporary Order on Detentions of  Security Offense 
Suspects’, 147 Terrorism and Democracy (2011).
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Regarding administrative detention without trial for Gazans, on 12 September 
2005, the very day that Israel completed the implementation of  its disengagement 
plan and declared an end to the military justice system in the Gaza Strip, the mili-
tary authorities issued detention orders under the 2002 Internment of  Unlawful 
Combatants Law against two Gaza residents. Since then, the law – enacted originally 
to intern Lebanese nationals as potential ‘bargaining chips’ for the exchange of  Israeli 
prisoners of  war – has been primarily used to detain Palestinians from the Gaza Strip 
without trial.148
As was the case in apartheid South Africa – where ‘executive detention’ was 
employed but on a lesser scale – measures pursued by the state in denial of  the rights 
to life and liberty of  person of  a particular group are implemented primarily to elimi-
nate dissent or resistance to Israeli rule. The practices are discriminatory in that they 
are applied virtually exclusively to Palestinians. Jewish settlers in the West Bank are 
subject to a separate system of  Israeli civil laws and courts that apply far more gener-
ous standards of  evidence and procedure than the military law and courts to which 
Palestinians are subject. The use of  administrative detention as a form of  domination 
over the local population is indicated by the figures: in contrast to the tens of  thou-
sands of  Palestinians interned by rolling six-month orders lasting up to several years 
in many cases, just nine Jewish Israeli settlers in the Palestinian territories have been 
administratively detained over the course of  the occupation,149 generally for periods 
of  40 to 60 days.150
Article 2(c) of  the Apartheid Convention is a broad clause defining as acts of  apart-
heid any measures calculated to prevent a racial group from participating in the 
political, social, economic, and cultural life of  the country and the deliberate creation 
of  conditions preventing the full development of  the group, in particular through 
the denial of  basic human rights and freedoms. The provision cites nine such rights 
and freedoms the denial of  which would adversely affect the participation and full 
development of  the subjugated group, encompassing civil and political rights as 
well as elements relevant to the group’s socio-economic and cultural development. 
Abundant evidence is available to suggest that Israel persistently denies such rights 
to Palestinians. For our present purposes it is befitting to highlight the conclusions of  
the HSRC research pertaining to the nine rights and freedoms to which Article 2(c) 
refers:
–  Restrictions on Palestinians’ right to freedom of  movement are endemic, including 
Israel’s control of  the OPT border crossings, extensive impediments to travel and access 
raised by the Wall, the matrix of  checkpoints and separate roads within the West Bank, 
and the obstructive and all-encompassing permit and ID card systems.
148 B’Tselem and HaMoked, Without Trial: Administrative Detention of  Palestinians by Israel and the Internment 
of  Unlawful Combatants Law (2009), at 55–69.
149 B’Tselem, ‘Statistics on Administrative Detention’, as of  20 Mar. 2013, available at: www.btselem.org/
english/Administrative_Detention/Statistics.asp.
150 See, e.g., Amnesty International, ‘Administrative detention cannot replace proper administration of  jus-
tice’, 11 Aug. 2005, AI Index: MDE 15/045/2005, regarding the detention of  alleged Kach activists 
Ephraim Hershkowitz and Gilad Shochat.
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–  Palestinian freedom of  residence is severely curtailed by systematic administrative 
restrictions on both residency and building in East Jerusalem, by discriminatory legisla-
tion that operates to prevent Palestinian spouses from living together on the basis of  
which part of  the OPT they originate from, and by the strictures of  the permit and ID 
systems.
–  Palestinians are systematically denied enjoyment of  their right to leave and return 
to their country. Palestinian refugees now living in the OPT (approximately 1.8 mil-
lion people) are not allowed to return to their homes, while Palestinian refugees out-
side Israel and the OPT (approximately 4.5 million) are not allowed to return to either 
territory. Similarly, hundreds of  thousands of  Palestinians displaced from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 have been prevented from returning to the OPT. Many 
Palestinian residents of  the OPT must obtain Israeli permission to leave the territory 
(which is often denied), political activists and human rights defenders are often subject 
to arbitrary and undefined ‘travel bans’, while many Palestinians who travelled abroad 
for business or personal reasons have had their residence IDs revoked and been prohib-
ited from returning.
–  Palestinians are denied their right to a nationality in two ways. Israel denies Palestinian 
refugees now living in the OPT who fled their homes inside the Green Line the right of  
return, reside and obtain citizenship in the successor state (Israel) now governing the 
land of  their birth. Israel also effectively denies Palestinians their right to a nationality 
by obstructing the exercise of  the Palestinian right to self-determination and prevent-
ing the formation of  an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank (including East 
Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip.
–  Palestinians are restricted in their right to work, through Israeli policies that severely 
curtail Palestinian agriculture and industry in the OPT, restrict exports and imports, 
and obstruct internal movement by Palestinians, including by impairing their access to 
their own agricultural land and travel for employment and business. Although formerly 
significant, Palestinian access to work inside Israel has been curtailed in recent years by 
prevailing closure policies and is now negligible. Palestinian unemployment in the OPT 
as a whole has reached almost 50 percent.
–  Palestinian trade unions exist but are not recognised by the Israeli government or by the 
Histadrut (the largest Israeli trade union) and cannot effectively represent Palestinians 
working for Israeli employers and businesses. Palestinian unions are also prohibited 
from functioning in Israeli settlements. Although they are required to pay dues, the 
interests and concerns of  Palestinian workers are not represented by the Histadrut, and 
Palestinians have no voice in Histadrut policies.
–  Palestinians’ right to education is not impacted directly by Israeli policy, as Israel does 
not operate the school system in the OPT, but is severely impeded by military rule. Israeli 
military actions have included extensive school closures, direct attacks on schools, 
severe restrictions on movement, and arrests and detention of  teachers and students. 
Israel’s denial of  exit permits, particularly for Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, has pre-
vented thousands of  students from continuing their education abroad. Discrimination 
in relation to education is striking in East Jerusalem, and is further indicated by a paral-
lel Jewish Israeli school system in illegal settlements throughout the West Bank, sup-
ported by the Israeli government.
–  Palestinians are denied the right to freedom of  opinion and expression through 
censorship laws enforced by the military authorities and endorsed by the Supreme 
Court. Palestinian newspapers must have a military permit and publications must 
be pre-approved by the military censor. Since 2001, the Israeli GPO [Government 
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Press Office] has drastically limited Palestinian press accreditation. Journalists are 
regularly restricted from entering the Gaza Strip and Palestinian journalists suf-
fer from patterns of  harassment, detention, confiscation of  materials, and even 
killing.
–  Palestinians’ right to freedom of  peaceful assembly and association is impeded 
through military orders that ban public gatherings of  ten or more persons without 
a permit from the Israeli military commander. Non-violent demonstrations are regu-
larly suppressed by the Israeli army with live ammunition, tear gas, and arrests. Most 
Palestinian political parties have been declared illegal and institutions associated with 
those parties, such as charities and cultural organizations, are regularly subjected to 
closure and attack.151
The breadth and consistency of  such infringements suggest that they do not occur in 
isolation, but are part of  a system that operates to control and dominate Palestinians 
in the occupied territory and to suppress any opposition to that domination. It bears 
noting that the web of  relatively obscure and inaccessible military orders and regula-
tions, combined with bureaucratic restrictions that are often racialized in implemen-
tation rather than on paper, makes the depth of  Israel’s systemic discrimination less 
immediately conspicuous than its counterpart in South Africa, where explicitly racist 
and freely available legislation made the apartheid regime in some sense more ‘hon-
est’ in its discriminatory intent. This is nowhere more apparent than in the case of  
‘road apartheid’ (which was not practised in South Africa) in the West Bank which 
establishes separate but substantially unequal road networks for Jewish settlers and 
Palestinians, without any clear legal basis and without any notice of  reservation152 of  
the kind that South Africa used to reserve separate parks, buses, beaches, and other 
public amenities for exclusively white occupation.
While Richard Goldstone rebutted as slanderous the suggestion that Israeli policy 
was indicative of  apartheid in an opinion piece in the New York Times in November 
2011,153 the 2009 report of  the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (chaired 
by Goldstone and referred to by himself  and others as the ‘Goldstone Report’) is in fact 
supportive of  a finding of  apartheid in the occupied Palestinian territory in respect 
of  Article 2(a) and (c) of  the Apartheid Convention. Without explicit recourse to the 
language of  apartheid, the Report invokes evidence of  ‘discrimination and differen-
tial treatment’ between Palestinians and Israeli Jews in fields including: treatment 
by judicial authorities; land use, housing, and access to natural resources; citizen-
ship, residence, and family unification; access to food and water supplies; the use of  
force against demonstrators; freedom of  movement; access to health, education, and 
social services; and freedom of  association.154 On this basis it asserts conclusions of  
151 Tilley (ed.), supra note 19, at 216–218; for full elucidation see 146–196. For further extensive docu-
mentation of  Israeli practices relevant to Art. 2(c) see, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Separate and Unequal: 
Israel’s Discriminatory Treatment of  Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (2010).
152 Aloni, supra note 15.
153 Goldstone, supra note 23.
154 See Report of  the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, supra note 141, at paras 113, 
206, 208, 938, 1427, 1577, 1579, and 1616 respectively.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ejil/article-abstract/24/3/867/481600 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 06 August 2019
898 EJIL 24 (2013), 867–913
systematic discrimination against the Palestinians, and the potential commission of  
the related crime against humanity of  persecution:
The systematic discrimination, both in law and in practice, against Palestinians, in legis-
lation (including the existence of  an entirely separate legal and court system which offers 
systematically worse conditions compared with that applicable to Israelis), and practice dur-
ing arrest, detention, trial and sentence compared with Israeli citizens is contrary to ICCPR 
article 2 and potentially in violation of  the prohibition on persecution as a crime against 
humanity.155
Article 2(d) of  the Apartheid Convention prohibits measures designed to divide the 
population along racial lines. Such segregation can be understood as a central under-
pinning feature of  an apartheid system, and evokes the ‘grand apartheid’ element of  
the South African regime’s policy, particularly through its reference to the creation of  
separate reserves and ghettos for the members of  a particular racial group. The use of  
the term ‘reserves’ in the Convention stems specifically from the South African experi-
ence, stretching at least as far back as the 1913 Natives’ Land Act which restricted 
land ownership by native South Africans to designated ‘reserves’ comprising just 7 
per cent of  the territory of  South Africa; delineations that would later form the basis 
for the ‘homelands’ in which nominally independent ‘Bantustan’ statelets were to be 
created.
Policies pursued by successive Israeli governments over the course of  the occupa-
tion and particularly since the late 1970s, culminating in the construction of  the 
wall since 2002, have divided the occupied territory into a series of  non-contiguous 
enclaves or ‘reserves’ into which Palestinians are effectively confined.
Closures and restrictions of  movement into and out of  the Gaza Strip have steadily 
intensified to the point that it has been effectively severed from the rest of  the occupied 
territory. Since the removal of  Jewish settlers in 2005, Gaza effectively amounts to a 
besieged Palestinian ghetto, with the ‘open-air prison’ analogy repeatedly invoked.156 
The occupied territory’s economic and cultural hub, East Jerusalem, has also been 
starkly affected, isolated from the rest of  the territory through residence and move-
ment restrictions that further the explicit project of  ‘Judaizing’ the city and incorpo-
rating it fully into Israel.157 Palestinian residents of  East Jerusalem – while subjected to 
155 Ibid., at para. 1534.
156 Use of  this analogy has not been confined to journalists and activists, but has extended to such authori-
ties as the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the British Prime Minister. See, e.g., 
‘UN humanitarian chief  warns of  disaster if  Gaza siege continues’, Ha’aretz, 12 Mar. 2010, available at: 
www.haaretz.com/news/un-humanitarian-chief-warns-of-disaster-if-gaza-siege-continues-1.266453; 
‘Gaza is a prison camp, says David Cameron’, The Daily Telegraph, 27 July 2010, available at: www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/palestinianauthority/7912095/Gaza-is-a-prison-camp-says-
David-Cameron.html.
157 Upon concluding a 2-week visit to Israel and the OPT in Feb. 2012, Prof. Raquel Rolnik, UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing, highlighted Israel’s ‘implementation of  a strategy of  
Judaization and control of  the territory’ in Palestinian neighbourhoods of  East Jerusalem and other parts 
of  the West Bank: Rolnik, ‘Preliminary remarks on the mission to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory – 30 January to 12 February 2012’, available at: www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11815&LangID=E.
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Israeli jurisdiction, law, and taxation – have traditionally been excluded from citizen-
ship entitlements and deprived of  basic services. They are further targeted for exclu-
sion from residence in the city. Since 1995, over 10,000 Jerusalem resident IDs have 
been revoked by the Israeli authorities, with tens of  thousands more at risk of  a simi-
lar fate on account of  an unduly onerous ‘centre of  life’ test. In December 2011, the 
mayor of  Jerusalem signalled an intention to redraw the city’s municipal boundary 
in order to strip the 70,000 Palestinians living on the eastern side of  the wall of  their 
Jerusalem residence status.158 Such discriminatory bureaucratic realignments can 
be understood in the context of  Israeli ‘master plans’ detailing visions of  a ‘Greater 
Jewish Jerusalem’ in which the Palestinian segment of  the city’s population is further 
reduced.
The rest of  the West Bank has been fragmented by the designation for exclusively 
Jewish use of  certain zones of  land, to which Palestinian entry is banned without a 
permit,159 with Israeli travel into Palestinian enclaves similarly prohibited. The Jordan 
Valley, comprising approximately 30 per cent of  the West Bank and containing its 
most fertile land and important water sources, is a particularly glaring embodiment 
of  the expropriation of  land by the dominant group for the purposes of  territorial frag-
mentation and creation of  segregated cantons. Under military legislation passed at the 
outset of  the occupation in 1967, much of  the Jordan Valley was closed to Palestinian 
access and development. In the wake of  five decades of  settlement construction and 
confiscation of  further land, Israel now maintains full control of  78.3 per cent of  
the Jordan Valley.160 15 per cent of  the territory is currently under the direct con-
trol of  Jewish settlements (enjoyed by just 9,500 Jewish settlers in 37 settlements), 
with more than 40 per cent designated as ‘closed military zones’ and over 20 per cent 
as ‘nature reserves’ which are closed to Palestinian residence or movement but often 
form the basis for settlement expansion.161 Concerted policies of  home demolition 
and forced displacement have diminished the number of  Palestinian residents in the 
Jordan Valley from an estimated 200,000 in 1967 to just 56,000 in 2011, confined to 
a small fraction of  its land area and prevented from accessing the Palestinian shores of  
the Dead Sea.162 Access to the Jordan Valley for Palestinians resident elsewhere in the 
158 Hasson, ‘Israel gearing for effective separation of  East Jerusalem Palestinians’, Ha’aretz, 23 Dec. 2011, avail-
able at: www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-gearing-for-effective-separation-of-east-jerusalem- 
palestinians-1.403034.
159 By Dec. 2011, Israel’s regulation of  Palestinian movement had grown into a ‘vast, triple-digit bureau-
cracy’, with 101 different types of  permits now used to govern Palestinian movement. Levinson, ‘Israel 
has 101 different types of  permits governing Palestinian movement’, Ha’aretz, 23 Dec. 2011, available at: 
www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-has-101-different-types-of-permits-governing-palestinian- 
movement-1.403039.
160 UN Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs, West Bank Movement and Access Update (2011), 
at 22.
161 Ibid.
162 Here it is worth noting that it is often stated that Israel does not segregate access to beaches, and thus 
compares favourably to apartheid South Africa where certain beaches were designated as ‘white-only’ 
and others for non-whites. Access to the Dead Sea’s West Bank beaches for West Bank Palestinians is not 
on an officially segregated basis but is effectively entirely precluded by permit and checkpoint regimes.
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West Bank is heavily restricted by administrative impediments buttressed by a physi-
cal ring of  checkpoints and trenches. Such contemporary ‘facts on the ground’ cor-
respond neatly with the ‘Allon Plan’,163 which set out a blueprint for Israeli annexation 
of  the Jordan Valley at the outset of  its occupation in 1967.
The wall that Israel commenced building through the West Bank in 2002, and which 
was held to be contrary to international law by the International Court of  Justice in 
2004,164 is a major exercise in both social engineering and territorial fragmentation. 
Today it is clear that security is at best a secondary justification for the wall. Its pri-
mary purpose is the annexation of  land in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that 
accommodates Jewish settlements.165 The wall not only results in the unlawful seizure 
of  10.2 per cent of  West Bank territory but effectively divides the West bank into three 
principal cantons – north, centre, and south – and numerous sub-cantons.166 Israel’s 
wall and its associated infrastructure of  gates and permanent checkpoints reveal an 
intention to impose a system of  permanent enclaves in which residence and passage 
are determined by racial identities – within the context of  the occupation while it per-
sists, and ultimately facilitating the annexation of  large swathes of  the West Bank. 
This will leave for the Palestinians, at best, the possibility of  a Bantustan-type state in 
the remaining reserves.
Formal blueprints aimed at dividing the West Bank into Jewish and Palestinian 
zones can be traced back at least as far as 1978, when the Jewish Agency, a para-
statal Jewish-national organization charged with the development and management 
of  national assets, formally declared the West Bank to be a permanent part of  ‘Eretz 
Israel’, and its sister organization, the World Zionist Organization, presented a ‘Master 
Plan for the Development of  Settlement in Judea and Samaria, 1979–1983’.167 
Outlining the need for the establishment of  Jewish settlements in the territory in order 
to ensure permanent Jewish Israeli control over the land, the plan was adopted by the 
Likud government at the time.168 The operation of  the Jewish-national institutions in 
partnership with government ministries as authorized agencies of  the state illuminates 
163 Drafted by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon shortly after the Six-Day War in 1967.
164 Legal Consequences of  the Construction of  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [2004] ICJ Rep 136.
165 The function of  the wall as an instrument of  annexation has been consistently clear in the statements 
of  Israeli leaders. For just one example see the assertion of  then Justice Minister Tzipi Livni in 2005 that 
the wall will serve will serve as ‘the future border of  the state of  Israel’: Yoaz, ‘Justice minister: West Bank 
fence is Israel’s future border’, Ha’aretz, 1 Dec. 2005, available at: www.haaretz.com/news/justice-min-
ister-west-bank-fence-is-israel-s-future-border-1.175645. A  Jan. 2012 proposal by Israel that its final 
borders should be based on the route of  the wall so as to encompass the settlements on its western side, 
as well as all of  East Jerusalem, is the latest reiteration of  this blueprint: Daraghmeh and Perry, ‘Israel 
proposes West Bank barrier as border’, Associated Press, 27 Jan. 2012.
166 J. Dugard, ‘Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the situation of  human rights in the Palestinian territo-
ries occupied since 1967’, UN Doc. A/62/275, 17 Aug. 2007, at para. 28.
167 World Zionist Organization, ‘Master Plan for the Development of  Settlement in Judea and Samaria 1979–
1983’ (Oct. 1978), available as an annex to UN Doc. A/34/605-S/13582, 22 Oct. 1979.
168 Known also as the ‘Drobles Plan’ after its chief  author, Matityahu Drobles (chairman of  the World Zionist 
Organization’s Settlement Division from 1978 to 1992), the plan advised that the ‘best and most effective 
way to remove any shred of  doubt regarding our intention to hold Judea and Samaria forever is a rapid 
settlement drive in these areas’.
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the racially contingent nature of  Israel’s land and planning policies. The role of  the 
World Zionist Organization includes the planning, funding, and construction of  West 
Bank settlements for exclusively Jewish use.169 In order to obtain the land necessary 
for such settlement construction and expansion, Israel has extensively appropriated 
land in the West Bank, which is censured as an act of  apartheid in Article 2(d) of  the 
Convention when carried out for the purpose of  dividing the population along racial 
lines. The World Zionist Organization’s follow-up plan regarding implementation of  
its 1978 settlement master plan, presented in 1980 and adopted by the Israeli govern-
ment in January 1981, set out clear motives and strategies for land appropriation in 
the occupied territory:
In light of  the current negotiations on the future of  Judea and Samaria, it will now become 
necessary for us to conduct a race against time. During this period, everything will be mainly 
determined by the facts we establish in these territories and less by any other considerations. 
… Therefore, the state-owned lands and the uncultivated barren lands in Judea and Samaria 
ought to be seized right away, with the purpose of  settling the areas between and around the 
centers occupied by the minorities so as to reduce to the minimum the danger of  an additional 
Arab state being established in these territories. Being cut off  by Jewish settlements the minor-
ity population will find it difficult to form a territorial and political continuity.170
Overall, more than 40 per cent of  the land mass of  the West Bank has now been 
appropriated to make way for Israeli settlement infrastructure and is entirely closed to 
Palestinian use.171 With the separate road networks connecting the settlement blocs 
to each other and to Israel creating an extensive grid that in many places cannot be 
crossed by Palestinians, access to much of  the rest of  the territory is also significantly 
restricted. The West Bank, for Palestinians, is thus reduced to a series of  dismembered 
enclaves.
Article 2(f) of  the Apartheid Convention relates to the persecution of  organizations 
and persons who oppose a prevailing system of  apartheid. Persecution in this con-
text entails the deprivation of  fundamental rights and freedoms. While law condones 
the deprivation of  rights in some cases in defence of  state security, regimes of  racial 
domination are typically exemplified by illegitimate acts of  repression that go beyond 
what can be justified by reference to national security. Cases of  extra-judicial killings, 
torture, and mass imprisonment of  Palestinians coming under the rubric of  Article 
2(a) of  the Convention fall into the latter category, as do restrictions of  freedom of  
expression and association within the meaning of  Article 2(c). The systematic target-
ing of  Palestinian political leaders, community activists, and human rights defend-
ers can be understood as persecution for opposition to Israel’s regime of  domination 
in the occupied territories within the meaning of  Article 2(f). In 2009, for example, 
169 Significantly, the body that approves settlement construction, the Joint Settlement Committee, is com-
prised of  an equal number of  relevant Israeli ministers and executive members of  the World Zionist 
Organization.
170 World Zionist Organization, Settlement in Judea and Samaria – Strategy, Policy and Plans (Sept. 1980), avail-
able as an annex to UN Doc. A/36/341-S/14566, 19 June 1981.
171 UN Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians 
of  Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure in the West Bank (2007).
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45 members of  the Palestinian Legislative Council (constituting more than a third of  
Palestine’s elected parliamentarians) sat not in parliament but in Israeli jails.172 With 
the majority of  these individuals convicted of  membership of  political parties desig-
nated as illegal by Israel, and eight of  them interned without charge or trial, the aim 
of  suppressing political opposition to Israel’s rule is manifest. Recent years have also 
witnessed the closure of  charitable, educational, and cultural organizations affiliated 
to Hamas and other banned political parties, as well as the imposition of  indefinite 
travel bans on human rights defenders who speak out against Israel’s instruments of  
occupation. Weekly non-violent protests in the West Bank against the wall and the 
discriminatory administration of  land and other resources are routinely met with 
excessive force and mass arrests by the Israeli military.
A concerted legislative strategy has been pursued in the Knesset by Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s coalition governments since 2009, seeking to further stifle and punish 
opposition to Israeli domination over the Palestinians. The primary target of  this leg-
islative surge are individuals and organizations challenging state policy vis-à-vis the 
Palestinians. Concerned as they are with protecting the institutions and policies that 
underpin Israel as a state that privileges Jewish nationals, such measures are relevant 
to any opposition to its regime of  domination over the Palestinians, transcending both 
geographical and racial lines within Israel/Palestine. In this regard, Jewish Israeli 
individuals or organizations commemorating the Palestinian nakba, for example, are 
as susceptible to persecution as Palestinians.173 Significantly, Article 2(f), unlike the 
other provisions detailing acts of  apartheid, does not require that the act be com-
mitted against a member or members of  the subjugated racial group, but relates to 
persecution against any persons or organizations who oppose the apartheid system 
in question. This stems from the South African experience where numerous white 
anti-apartheid activists were banned, detained, or even physically targeted for their 
political beliefs and actions. Jewish Israelis are routinely arrested for participating in 
protests against Israeli domination over the Palestinians, and, along with Palestinians, 
are subject to sanction under measures such as the 2011 Law Preventing Harm to the 
State of  Israel by Means of  Boycott.
Issued by a broad collective of  political parties, unions, and civil society organi-
zations in 2005, the Palestinian call for boycott, divestment, and sanctions against 
Israeli state institutions and agents is grounded in Israel’s failure to dismantle the 
wall, its continuing occupation and colonization of  Palestinian land, and, notably, its 
‘entrenched system of  racial discrimination’ against the Palestinians.174 The boycott 
movement gained substantial momentum following Israel’s ‘Operation Cast Lead’ 
offensive in the Gaza Strip in 2008–2009 and its attack in international waters on 
172 Statistics provided by Addameer – Prisoners’ Support and Human Rights Association.
173 Enacted in Mar. 2011, the Law to Amend the 1985 State Budget Law (the ‘Nakba Law’) authorizes Israel’s 
Minister of  Finance to cut funding or support to any institution that conducts activity contradicting the 
definition of  Israel as a ‘Jewish and democratic’ state, or that commemorates ‘Israel’s Independence Day 
or the day on which the state was established as a day of  mourning’.
174 ‘Palestinian Civil Society Call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions’, 9 July 2005, available at: www.
bdsmovement.net/call.
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the ‘Gaza Freedom Flotilla’ in May 2010,175 and has been supported by sympathetic 
Jewish groups in Israel and abroad.176 Article 2 of  the Law Preventing Harm to the 
State of  Israel by Means of  Boycott makes it a civil wrong to call for a boycott against 
the state of  Israel. This applies to boycotts imposed on actors due to their association 
with the state of  Israel, one of  its institutions, or an area under its control,177 including 
the occupied Palestinian territory. Boycotts of  items produced in illegal Israeli settle-
ments in the West Bank are thus also included.
The available evidence does not suggest that each and every inhuman act allowed 
for by the definition of  apartheid is relevant to the Palestinian context. Article 2(b) of  
the Apartheid Convention borrows language from the Genocide Convention in its ref-
erence to ‘the deliberate imposition on a racial group of  living conditions calculated to 
cause its physical destruction in whole or in part’. Israeli policies of  collective punish-
ment in the Palestinian territories generally and in the Gaza Strip in particular entail 
grave consequences for life and health and amount to serious violations of  interna-
tional humanitarian and human rights law.178 So too the consistent demolition of  
Palestinian homes,179 which combines with other Israeli practices to result in the 
imposition of  living conditions that threaten the welfare, and in some instances the 
very survival, of  sections of  the Palestinian people. However inhuman such actions 
may be, they do not meet the threshold required by this provision of  intent to cause 
the physical destruction of  the Palestinian people. Here, it bears noting that the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission arrived at a similar conclusion for its 
part, holding that despite the devastating effects of  apartheid policies on living condi-
tions and health, the South African government did not sustain an intentional policy 
to destroy the black population.180
It is clear from the wording of  the Apartheid Convention and from the South 
African precedent that the existence of  an apartheid regime does not require all of  the 
inhuman acts envisaged in Article 2 of  the Convention to be prevalent. An apartheid 
regime is defined by the commission of  such acts in a manner sufficiently extensive to 
qualify as institutionalized and systematic domination.
175 For documentation and analysis of  alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by both 
Israel’s military and Palestinian armed groups in the context of  Operation Cast Lead see Report of  the 
United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, supra note 141. For documentation and a 
somewhat patchy legal analysis of  the flotilla incident see ‘Report of  the international fact-finding mis-
sion to investigate violations of  international law, including international humanitarian and human 
rights law, resulting from the Israeli attacks on the flotilla of  ships carrying humanitarian assistance’, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/15/21, 22 Sept. 2010.
176 Groups such as: Boycott from Within; Not in Our Name: Jews Opposing Zionism; the International Jewish 
Anti-Zionist Network.
177 Art. 1, 2011 Law Preventing Harm to the State of  Israel by Means of  Boycott.
178 For further discussion of  this matter see, e.g., No Safe Place: Report of  the Independent Fact Finding Committee 
on Gaza, presented to the League of  Arab States on 30 Apr. 2009.
179 According to UN figures, the demolition of  homes by Israel in the West Bank displaced nearly 1,100 
Palestinians in 2011, over half  of  them children. This represents a 42% increase on demolitions car-
ried out in 2010: UN Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Demolitions and Forced 
Displacement in the Occupied West Bank’ (Jan. 2012).
180 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of  South Africa Report (1998), i, Ch. 4, Appendix, para. 4, at 94.
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C Institutionalized and Systematic Discrimination and Domination
Article 2 of  the Apartheid Convention requires that, for the commission of  the crime of  
apartheid, the inhuman acts must have been ‘committed for the purpose of  establishing 
and maintaining domination by one racial group of  persons over any other racial group 
of  persons and systematically oppressing them’. The primary impetus of  the commission 
of  the practices of  the Israeli civil and military authorities in the occupied Palestinian 
territory is to insulate and privilege Jewish settlements and settler infrastructure, and to 
ensure that Palestinians intrude as little as possible on the lives of  settlers. The dominant 
group for the purposes of  the Apartheid Convention is therefore the Jewish settler group, 
numbering over half  a million in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, whose mere 
presence violates Article 49(6) of  the Fourth Geneva Convention.181 Having identified 
the dominant group, the next question that must be considered is whether the acts in 
question have been committed for the purpose or intention of  maintaining domination 
by the Jewish group over the Palestinian group and systematically oppressing them.
From the above examination of  the inhuman acts perpetrated by Israel in the occu-
pied Palestinian territory it is clear that such acts do not occur in a random and isolated 
manner but are part of  a widespread and oppressive regime that is both institutional-
ized and systematic. This regime is founded on a discriminatory ideology that elevates 
Jews to a higher status and accords separate and unequal treatment to Palestinians. 
Inevitably, as shown by the experience of  apartheid South Africa, such discrimina-
tion results in the domination of  the ‘superior’ group over the ‘inferior’ group, and it 
becomes impossible to refute the conclusion that the purpose of  such discrimination is 
domination. As the discriminatory nature of  Israel’s relations with Palestinians may 
be contested it is necessary to examine this matter in some detail.
Underpinning Israel’s discriminatory policies against the Palestinians – both within 
Israel and in the occupied Palestinian territory – is a legal system that constructs a 
notion of  ‘Jewish nationality’ and privileges Jewish nationals over non-Jewish groups 
under Israeli jurisdiction. Israeli law is somewhat unique in distinguishing between 
nationality (in Hebrew, le’om) and citizenship (ezrahūt), with Israel constituted as the 
state of  the Jewish nation. For purposes of  law as well as policy, no ‘Israeli nation’ exists. 
Israeli Supreme Court jurisprudence confirms that Israel is defined as the state not of  the 
‘Israeli nation’ but of  the ‘Jewish nation’ (le’om yahūdi). In the Tamarin case, the plaintiff  
sought to register his nationality as ‘Israeli’ as opposed to ‘Jewish’, but the Court found 
that ‘there is no Israeli nation separate from the Jewish nation’, with the Jewish nation 
‘composed not only of  those residing in Israel but also of  Diaspora Jewry’. The decision 
made it clear that to recognize a common Israeli nationality would be to ‘negate the 
very foundation upon which the State of  Israel was formed’.182
181 UN SC Res. 446, 22 Mar. 1979; Legal Consequences of  the Construction of  a Wall, supra note 164, at para. 
120.
182 George Rafael Tamarin v. State of  Israel, (1970) 26 PD I 197. Another claim for recognition of  uniform 
Israeli nationality was lodged with the Supreme Court in 2004 but at the time of  writing remains pend-
ing: see Cook, ‘Lawsuit Challenges Israel’s Discriminatory Citizenship Definition’, The National, 6 Apr. 
2010.
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Thus a two-tiered system of  civil status among Israeli citizens is created, with Jewish 
nationals privileged over non-Jewish citizens. Israeli citizenship is based on four crite-
ria: birth, residence, marriage, and immigration; albeit with exclusions provided in 
the Law of  Citizenship and Entry into Israel barring ‘enemies of  the State’ (compris-
ing Palestinians from the occupied territories as well as nationals of  Lebanon, Syria, 
Jordan, and Iran) from entitlement to Israeli citizenship or residence rights. Non-Jews 
who hold Israeli citizenship remain subordinated by virtue of  the fact that they are not 
Jewish nationals (a primarily descent-based status reserved for those born to a Jewish 
mother, with allowance also made for tightly restricted procedures of  conversion to 
Judaism). Thus, while Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship make up approximately 
20 per cent of  the state’s population and are entitled to vote as citizens, they are 
hugely restricted in critical areas such as land use and access to natural resources and 
key services, excluded by planning laws and institutions, and systematically discrimi-
nated against at municipal and national levels in the sphere of  economic, social, and 
cultural rights.183 Jewish nationals, whose exclusive interests are served by parastatal 
institutions such as the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund,184 are privy to 
exclusive access to most of  the state’s territory and to claim extra-territorial rights and 
privileges in areas controlled by Israel.
Such material benefits emanate from the 1950 Law of  Return, which defines who 
is a Jew for purposes of  the legal system and entitles every Jew to immigrate to Israel 
(extending, since 1967, to the occupied Palestinian territory) under an oleh visa. 
The 1952 Citizenship Law then grants such immigrants the right to gain immedi-
ate citizenship, while explicitly excluding those who were residents and citizens of  
Palestine before the creation of  the state of  Israel if  they were not ‘in Israel, or in an 
area which became Israeli territory after the establishment of  the State, from the day 
of  the establishment of  the State [May 1948] to the day of  the coming into force of  
this Law [April  1952]’.185 Thus, long-time Palestinian residents who were forcibly 
displaced during the war of  1948 were legally barred from taking up citizenship in 
the newly created state and returning to their homes, while others with no prior 
connection to Israel are entitled to citizenship on the basis of  a constructed Jewish 
nationality. This situation of  preferential citizenship is further inscribed in Israel’s 
constitutional law,186 with a number of  the Basic Laws codifying Israel as ‘the state 
of  the Jewish people’.187 The premise of  Israel as a Jewish state amounts to more than 
183 See, e.g., Tekiner, ‘On the Inequality of  Israeli Citizens’, 1(1) Without Prejudice (1998) 9.
184 The role of  such Jewish national institutions in administering land and exercising governmental func-
tions on behalf  of  the state has been the subject of  consistent concerns raised by UN human rights 
treaty-monitoring bodies: see, e.g., ‘Concluding Observations of  the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Israel’, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.27, 4 Dec. 1998, at para. 11; ‘Concluding Observations 
of  the Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination: Israel’, UN Doc. CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, 9 
Mar. 2007, at para. 19.
185 Art. 3, 1952 Citizenship Law.
186 Israel does not have a written Constitution, but a series of  Basic Laws operate in practice as the constitu-
tional law of  the state.
187 See, e.g., Basic Law: Knesset (1992); Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992); Basic Law: Freedom 
of  Occupation (1958).
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mere symbolism, underpinning as it does much of  the Israeli legal system. Notably, 
for instance, Basic Law: Israel Lands (1960) provides that ownership of  real property 
(‘land, houses, buildings and anything permanently fixed to land’) held by the state of  
Israel, the Development Authority, and the Jewish National Fund ‘shall not be trans-
ferred either by sale or any other manner’ but is to be held in perpetuity for the benefit 
of  the Jewish people. According to government sources, ‘93% of  the land in Israel is in 
the public domain; that is, either property of  the state, the Jewish National Fund or the 
Development Authority’,188 and thus cannot be leased or bought by non-Jews, even 
non-Jewish citizens of  Israel.189
The codification of  Jewish nationality is equally significant to the situation of  the 
occupied Palestinian territory, where Israeli law is channelled in a number of  ways to 
provide Jewish Israeli settlers with comparable privileges over Palestinian residents. 
In the sphere of  land law, the disparity referred to above regarding exclusive Jewish 
access relates similarly to any land in occupied territory that is declared or treated 
as ‘state land’ by Israel. The 1951 State Property Law allows for the incorporation of  
state land anywhere ‘in which the law of  the State of  Israel applies’,190 thus encom-
passing territory occupied by Israel. Large areas of  the West Bank have been declared 
state land by Israel and closed to Palestinian use for the construction of  Jewish settle-
ments, military outposts, and nature reserves, placing much of  the territory under the 
rubric of  an institutional framework designed to administer state land for the exclu-
sive benefit of  the Jewish people.
With exceptions in certain settlements in East Jerusalem, residence in Jewish settle-
ments in the occupied territory is closed to Palestinians; open only to Israelis or ‘to 
persons of  Jewish descent entitled to Israeli citizenship or residency under Israel’s Law 
of  Return’. The latter category is significant in highlighting the racialized nature of  
Israel’s colonization and administration of  the territories, with even non-Israeli Jews 
188 Israel Land Administration, ‘General Information’, available at: www.mmi.gov.il/Envelope/indexeng.
asp?page=/static/eng/f_general.html.
189 Proposed constitutional legislation, tabled in the Knesset in 2011 in the form of  the Draft Basic Law: 
Israel – the Nation-State of  the Jewish People, seeks to further elevate the status of  the Jewish character of  
the Israeli state. In response, the Knesset’s Legal Advisor, Eyal Yinon, took the unusual step of  calling for a 
broad public and parliamentary debate on the bill, noting its implications for Israel’s constitutional make-
up as a ‘Jewish and democratic state’: no longer a horizontal balance between the two parts of  the for-
mula (Jewish and democratic), but rather the creation of  a vertical balance, so that after the law is passed, 
at the top of  the constitutional ladder will be the principle of  the state of  Israel as the nation-state of  the 
Jewish people, and only under it will be the principle of  the democratic state; and even then, it will be in 
a ‘slim’ formula that states ‘the State of  Israel has a democratic regime’, as opposed to ‘the State of  Israel 
is a democratic state’: quoted in Association for Civil Rights in Israel, ‘Knesset Winter Session Begins: 
Trends and Concerns’, 31 Oct. 2011. In Nov. 2011, a revised wording of  the bill was tabled following dis-
comfort among some parliamentarians over the perceptions of  the original version as overtly racist. The 
new draft, however, retains in more convoluted language the thrust of  the controversial clauses that pro-
pose to subordinate democratic rule to the Jewish nation, explicitly to bracket self-determination in Israel 
as the exclusive prerogative of  the Jewish people (in order to abrogate the possibility of  a binational state), 
and to strip Arabic of  its status as an official language of  the state on an equal footing with Hebrew: see 
Lis, ‘Dichter replaces “Jewish identity” bill with equally contentious draft law’, Ha’aretz, 15 Nov. 2011. At 
the time of  writing, the Knesset plenary vote on the bill has yet to take place.
190 State Property Law (5711-1951).
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191 Report of  the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, supra note 141, at para. 206, 
footnotes omitted.
192 ‘Report of  the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of  the Israeli 
settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of  the Palestinian people through-
out the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem’, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/63, 7 Feb. 2013, 
at para. 49.
193 Ibid., at para. 107.
granted privileges over the local Palestinian population. In this way race and nation-
ality are somewhat conflated (or confused), with discrimination present not merely 
between Israeli citizens and Palestinian non-citizens, but between those defined under 
Israeli law as Jewish nationals (i.e., those entitled to citizenship under the Law of  
Return) and those who are not. The Goldstone Report notes the ramifications when 
this underpinning feature of  Israeli law extends to the Palestinian territories:
The application of  Israeli domestic laws has resulted in institutionalized discrimination against 
Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory to the benefit of  Jewish settlers, both Israeli 
citizens and others. Exclusive benefits reserved for Jews derive from the two-tiered civil status 
under Israel’s domestic legal regime based on a ‘Jewish nationality,’ which entitles ‘persons of  
Jewish race or descendency [sic]’ to superior rights and privileges.191
An even stronger assessment is made by the Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission charged by the UN Human Rights Council with the task of  investigating the 
implications of  Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural 
rights of  the Palestinians throughout the OPT. In its report submitted in February 
2013, the mission examines the distinct legal systems that exist in the OPT for settlers 
and Palestinians and concludes:
The legal regime of  segregation operating in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has enabled the 
establishment and the consolidation of  the settlements through the creation of  a privileged legal 
space for settlements and settlers. It results in daily violations of  a multitude of  the human rights 
of  the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including, incontrovertibly, violating 
their rights to non-discrimination, equality before the law and equal protection of  the law.192
The Fact-Finding Mission shows how the settlers have abused their superior legal sta-
tus by resorting to violence against Palestinians and their property. It notes that the 
Israeli authorities have allowed these acts of  violence to continue with impunity and 
reaches ‘the clear conclusion that institutionalized discrimination is practiced against 
the Palestinian people when the issue of  violence is addressed’.193
The foundation provided by the concept of  Jewish nationality for an institutional-
ized system of  discrimination and domination is evidenced most visibly by this dual 
legal system in place in the West Bank, where Jewish settlers are subject to an entirely 
separate body of  laws and courts from Palestinian residents. At its most basic, this insti-
tutional segregation can be expounded as the application of  Israeli civilian law and 
constitutional protection to the former, and of  a military administration to the latter. 
Through a combination of  parliamentary and military legislation, the Israeli authori-
ties have created parallel legal universes whereby distinct regimes, premised on a prin-
ciple of  ‘separate but unequal’, apply to the two groups living in the one territory.
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The extension of  Israeli civil legislation and constitutional rights to Jewish settlers in 
Palestinian territory occurs on the basis of  a blend of  territorial and personal grounds. 
In terms of  application on a territorial basis, elements of  Israeli civil law are incorpo-
rated into those military orders that cover the administration of  Jewish Israeli settlement 
municipalities. This has been dubbed ‘channelling’,194 a process whereby the Israeli 
Military Commander for the area serves as a conduit for the application of  domestic 
legislation beyond Israeli territory by virtue of  military decrees issued in pursuance of  a 
mandate to regulate the management of  local and regional Jewish municipal councils 
in the West Bank.195 This allows certain Israeli laws to be extended to Israel’s settlements 
and annexed zones in the West Bank, creating enclaves where the legal and administra-
tive systems differ profoundly from the surrounding territory. This effectively conflates 
law in the settlements with law inside Israel, erasing the barriers to annexation erected 
by the Green Line as far as Israeli authority and society are concerned.
Much civil and constitutional legislation is also applied extra-territorially on a per-
sonal basis to individual Jewish settlers in the occupied territories, both directly and 
through secondary legislation promulgated for that purpose. The 1977 Extension of  
Emergency Regulations Law, for example, allows Israelis suspected of  committing 
criminal offences in the West Bank to be prosecuted, not by military courts under the 
military legislative system that applies to Palestinians, but by Israeli criminal courts 
according to Israel’s penal code and criminal procedure:
In addition to the provisions of  any law, the court in Israel shall have authority to judge, accord-
ing to the law in force in Israel, a person located in Israel for his act or omission occurring in 
the Area [the West Bank], and also an Israeli for his act or omission occurring in the territory 
of  the Palestinian Council, all in case the act or omission would have been an offence, had they 
occurred within the jurisdiction of  the courts in Israel.196
The racialized nature of  this personal application of  Israeli criminal law is highlighted 
by section 6(b) of  the 1984 Addendum to the Law, which extends its application to 
residents of  the West Bank who are not Israeli citizens but who are entitled to immi-
grate to Israel by virtue of  the Law of  Return:
For the purposes of  the enactments enumerated in the Schedule, the expression “resident in Israel” 
or any other expression occurring in those enactments denoting residence, living or having one’s 
abode in Israel shall be regarded as including also a person who lives in a zone [in occupied terri-
tory] and is an Israeli national or is entitled to immigrate to Israel under the Law of  Return, 5710-
1950, and who would come within the scope of  such expression if  he lived in Israel.
Israeli law as extended to the occupied territories on a personal basis thus includes all 
Jews, whether they are Israeli citizens or not. Constitutional rights are also granted on 
194 Tilley (ed.), supra note 19, at 65.
195 Military Order No. 783, Order Concerning the Management of  Regional Councils (Judea and Samaria), 
25 Mar. 1979; Military Order No. 892, Order Concerning the Management of  Local Councils (Judea and 
Samaria), 1 Mar. 1981. The end result of  this arrangement is that settlement councils operate with pow-
ers and functions that differ significantly from those of  local Palestinian municipal councils in the West 
Bank, but are almost identical to those of  the local and regional councils inside Israel.
196 S. 2(a), The Extension of  Power of  Emergency Regulations Law (Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip – 
Adjudication of  Offences and Legal Aid), 1977.
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a personal basis to settlers, with the rationale given being the special link between the 
state and those settlers in areas under the state’s control. Regarding the application 
of  Israeli Basic Laws to settlers claiming compensation for their removal from illegal 
settlements in the Gaza Strip in 2005, the Supreme Court ruled:
We are of  the opinion that the Basic Laws grant rights to every Israeli settler in the area to be evacu-
ated. This application is personal. It derives from the control of  the State of  Israel over the area to be 
evacuated. It is the outcome of  the view that the State’s Basic Laws regarding human rights apply to 
Israelis located outside of  the State but in an area under its control by way of  belligerent occupation.197
The cumulative result of  the extension of  Israeli law into the occupied territory on 
a territorial basis through the administration of  settlement municipalities and on a 
personal basis is that the actual relevance of  the existing local law in the West Bank to 
a Jewish resident of  the West Bank is negligible.198
In contrast to its treatment of  Jewish residents of  the same territory, the Supreme 
Court has refused to extend constitutional protections to Palestinians.199 Palestinians 
are instead subject to the personal and territorial application of  Israeli military leg-
islation. In the first three months of  Israel’s occupation in 1967, over 100 pieces of  
military legislation were enacted in the West Bank and almost as many in the Gaza 
Strip. That extensive plans had been made in advance for a pervasive and institution-
alized occupation is clear. Just two days into the short Six-Day War of  1967, Military 
Proclamation No. 2200 vested all legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the Israeli 
Military Commander. Since then, the military authorities have promulgated over 
2,500 military orders altering pre-existing laws, regulating and controlling every-
thing from alcohol taxes201 to control of  natural resources202 to the types of  fruit and 
vegetables that can be grown by Palestinians.203 Among the most important security-
related military orders are Military Order No. 378 pertaining to criminal offences and 
detention,204 and Military Order No. 1229 allowing for ‘administrative’ detention 
without charge or trial for prolonged periods.205 Under this regime of  military law, 
197 The Regional Council of  Gaza Coast et  al. v. The State of  Israel et  al. (the Gaza Disengagement case), HCJ 
1661/05, judgment 9 June 2005, at para. 80.
198 This has long been acknowledged by Israeli constitutional scholars: see, e.g., Rubinstein, ‘The Changing 
Status of  the Held Territories’. 11 Eyunei Mishpat (1986) 439.
199 See, e.g., the Gaza Disengagement case, supra note 197; Adalah et  al. v.  Minister of  Interior et  al., HCJ 
7052/03, judgment of  14 May 2006 (the Family Unification case); Adalah v. The Minister of  Defence, HCJ 
8276/05, judgment of  12 Dec. 2006 (the No Compensation Law case).
200 Military Proclamation No. 2, Concerning Regulation and Authority of  the Judiciary, 7 June 1967.
201 Military Order No. 38, Order Concerning Alcoholic Beverages, 4 July 1967.
202 See, inter alia, Military Order No. 92, Order Concerning Jurisdiction Over Water Regulations, 15 Aug. 1967.
203 See, e.g., Military Order No. 474, Order Concerning Amending the Law for the Preservation of  Trees 
and Plants, 26 July 1972; Military Order No. 1039, Order Concerning Control over the Planting of  
Fruit Trees, 5 Jan. 1983; Military Order No. 1147, Order Concerning Supervision over Fruit Trees and 
Vegetables, 30 July 1985.
204 Military Order No. 378, Order Concerning Security Provisions, 20 Apr. 1970.
205 Military Order No. 1229, Order Concerning Administrative Detention (Provisional Regulations), 17 Mar. 
1988. Due to numbering inconsistencies among Israeli military orders, Military Order No. 1229 is alter-
natively referred to as Military Order No. 1226, depending on whether it was issued individually or in a 
bound volume by the Israeli authorities.
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Palestinians are systematically subject to far longer pre-charge periods of  detention 
and harsher sentences than their Jewish Israeli counterparts arrested on suspicion of  
committing the same crime in the same territory.206 The military orders are enforced 
in a military court system that has become ‘an institutional centrepiece of  the Israeli 
state’s apparatus of  control over Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza’.207
The result of  the preferential status accorded to Jewish nationals under Israeli law 
and the application of  Israeli civil law to Jewish settlers as contrasted with military law 
to Palestinians is clear: the institutionalization of  two separate legal systems for two sep-
arate racial groups in a manner that underpins a system of  domination by one over the 
other. According to one of  Israel’s leading Jewish Israeli human rights organizations:
In the same territorial area and under the same administration live two populations who are 
subject to two separate and contrasting legal systems and infrastructure. One population has 
full civil rights while the other is deprived of  those rights. … The settlers’ lives, although they 
live in an area under military rule, are in almost every respect the same as those of  Israeli citi-
zens living in Israel.208
In addition to the separate laws applied to the two groups, it must be noted that many 
further discriminatory features of  the architecture of  Israel’s occupation are founded in 
practice deriving from unpublished military regulations or de facto military policy without 
reference in law. The separate road system in the West Bank, for example, central to its ter-
ritorial fragmentation and distinctly evocative of  a sense of  apartheid despite the absence 
of  an equivalent in the South African context, evolved in the planning and construction 
realm as a prop for broader segregationist policies without a legislative foundation.
Few today question the conclusion that the purpose of  apartheid was to secure the 
domination of  white South Africans over the black population. This was the only infer-
ence to be drawn from the institutionalized and systematic nature of  the discrimina-
tion that comprised apartheid. Protestations that apartheid, or ‘separate development’ 
as the apartheid regime preferred to portray its policies after 1960, was a species of  
self-determination rather than racial superiority failed to impress a sceptical world 
that looked to the discriminatory and repressive nature of  the regime rather than the 
rhetoric of  self-determination and the ‘decolonization’ of  the Bantustans. Little credit 
was given to the apartheid government for the vast sums of  money it spent on develop-
ing the infrastructure of  the Bantustans and building roads, schools, universities, and 
hospitals in these territories. Deeds of  this kind were not seen to remove the taint of  
discrimination and domination that characterized apartheid.
206 E.g., a Palestinian and a Jewish settler arrested on suspicion of  the same act of  manslaughter in the West 
Bank are subject to markedly different procedures. The Palestinian may be detained for periods of  8 days 
(renewable) before being brought before a military judge, and is subject to a maximum sentence of  life 
imprisonment. The Jewish settler cannot be detained for more than 24 hours before being brought before 
a civilian judge, and is subject to a maximum sentence of  20 years’ imprisonment. See ss. 51A and 78 of  
Military Order No. 378, Order Concerning Security Provisions; s. 29(a) of  the 1996 Criminal Procedure 
Law (Enforcement powers – Arrests); and s. 298 of  the 1977 Penal Law.
207 Hajjar, supra note 138, at 2.
208 Association for Civil Rights in Israel, The State of  Human Rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 2008 
Report (2008), at 17.
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So too with Israel’s occupation of  Palestine. The only inference that can be drawn 
from the institutionalized and systematic regime of  inhuman acts and discrimination 
(unashamedly premised on an ideology of  entitlement) towards the Palestinian peo-
ple is that Israel intends to secure the domination of  Jewish Israelis over Palestinians. 
That this is the purpose of  Israel’s occupation of  the Palestinian territory is con-
firmed by its failure to facilitate the lives of  Palestinians and the infrastructure of  the 
occupied territory by constructing or maintaining hospitals, schools, and universi-
ties for the benefit of  the protected population as arguably required by the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.209 Instead, Israel leaves the welfare of  the occupied people to 
international donors and has created a cycle of  aid dependency. Israel’s lack of  regard 
for the needs of  the Palestinian people stands in contrast to the action taken by South 
Africa’s apartheid regime to improve material living conditions in the Bantustans it 
created. Such failure, coupled with the commission of  inhuman acts in a systematic, 
oppressive, and discriminatory manner, a fortiori provides evidence of  an intention to 
maintain the domination of  Jews over Palestinians.
* * *
The three ‘pillars’ of  apartheid that we have identified above in relation to the for-
mer South African regime are broadly reproduced today in Palestine. The demar-
cation of  distinct racial groups under the 1950 Population Registration Act in 
South Africa finds its equivalent in the Israeli–Palestinian context in the prefer-
ential legal status granted to those defined as Jewish nationals under the 1950 
Law of  Return. This superior status underpins the creation of  a dual legal system 
as well as systematic discrimination against Palestinians across a wide spectrum 
of  rights. The second pillar – a ‘grand apartheid’-like policy of  territorial frag-
mentation and racial segregation – is evidenced by Israel’s land appropriation and 
settlement policies, and its cantonization of  Palestinian territory. These policies 
serve to subject the Gaza Strip to hermetic closure and isolation, while carving the 
West Bank into an intricate network of  well-connected colonies for Jewish settlers 
on the one hand, and an archipelago of  non-contiguous and poorly connected 
enclaves for Palestinians on the other. A  visible grid of  walls, fences, trenches, 
roads, tunnels, and checkpoints and an invisible grid of  administrative controls on 
movement and residence in the form of  permit systems akin to South Africa’s pass 
laws combine to ensure the stringent segregation of  the Palestinian and Jewish 
populations. The third pillar upon which Israel’s systematic domination in the 
occupied Palestinian territory rests is the matrix of  security laws and practices 
(extra-judicial killing, internment and arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treat-
ment, use of  force against demonstrators, various forms of  banning of  individuals 
and organizations, implementation of  military law by military courts) invoked to 
validate the suppression of  opposition to the occupation and to buttress the extant 
system of  racial domination.
209 Arts 50 and 55–56 oblige an occupying power to facilitate the proper working of  educational institu-
tions, ensuring proper medical supplies and maintaining hospitals and public health.
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6  Conclusions: Situating Apartheid
In March 2012, the UN Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination took 
the unprecedented step of  censuring Israel under the rubric of  apartheid and segrega-
tion as prohibited by Article 3 of  the International Convention for the Elimination of  
All Forms of  Racial Discrimination. Having reiterated previous concerns about the 
general segregation of  Jewish and non-Jewish communities under Israeli jurisdiction, 
the Committee declared itself  ‘particularly appalled at the hermetic character of  the 
separation’ between Jewish and Palestinian populations in the occupied Palestinian 
territory and urged Israel to prohibit and eradicate policies or practices of  racial seg-
regation and apartheid that ‘severely and disproportionately affect the Palestinian 
population’.210
On the basis of  the systemic and institutionalized nature of  the racial domination 
that exists, there are indeed strong grounds to conclude that a system of  apartheid 
has developed in the occupied Palestinian territory. Israeli practices in the occupied 
territory are not only reminiscent of  – and, in some cases, worse than – apartheid as it 
existed in South Africa, but are in breach of  the legal prohibition of  apartheid.
The implications of  such a conclusion are significant. The absolute prohibition of  
apartheid stands in contrast to ‘grey area’ doctrines of  international humanitarian 
law such as proportionality and military necessity that remain prone to manipula-
tion and distortion in the narratives that seek to justify given military actions.211 As 
a ‘composite wrongful act’ of  international law, apartheid involves ‘a series of  acts or 
omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful’ and ‘give[s] rise to continuing breaches, 
which extend in time from the first of  the actions or omissions in the series of  acts 
making up the wrongful conduct’.212 The holistic portrait of  a systematic apparatus 
of  domination connects the dots between discrete and disparate rights violations, illu-
minating them against a common backdrop. In doing so it contributes to a small body 
of  literature that advances the legal analysis of  the situation in the West Bank and 
Gaza beyond the ‘habitual focus on specific actions undertaken within the occupation, as 
distinct from the nature of the occupation as a normative regime’,213 and facilitates an 
assessment of  the cumulative effect of  almost half  a century of  belligerent occupation 
where patterns of  domination have proliferated.
The existence of  a regime of  apartheid, amounting to an internationally wrong-
ful act, has clear implications under public international law – both for the state of  
Israel in terms of  cessation and reparation, and for third states in terms of  the duties 
of  co-operation, and of  non-recognition and non-assistance. As an internationally 
wrongful act and an international crime, apartheid may also assume a relevance to 
210 Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination, ‘Concluding observations: Israel’, UN Doc 
CERD/C/ISR/CO/14–16, 9 Mar. 2012, at para. 24.
211 On the attempted manipulation of  international humanitarian law by the Israeli military apparatus see, 
e.g., Kearney, ‘Lawfare, Legitimacy, and Resistance: The Weak and The Law’, XVI Palestine Yrbk Int’l L 
(2010) 79.
212 International Law Commission, supra note 80, at 62.
213 Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli, ‘Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, 23 
Berkeley J Int’l L (2005) 551, at 552 (emphasis in original).
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legal claims in domestic and international courts, in both the civil and criminal law 
spheres.214
The international campaign against apartheid in South Africa was emblematic of  
the struggle of  the decolonized third world. With the workings of  international law 
rarely favouring the people and nations of  the global South, it represents one of  the 
few major political success stories of  the human rights movement that post-colonial 
nations can claim ownership of.215 Despite consistent Palestinian efforts to engage 
with the mechanisms of  international law, the Palestinians have largely been excluded 
from international legal protection.216 The significance of  apartheid lies not just in the 
strength of  its legal prohibition, but in the political purchase that it carries.
As happened in South Africa, what begins as segregation is liable to evolve into an 
institutionalized system of  racial domination. Such separateness cannot be sustained 
without spawning suffering and cycles of  violence. The US underwent a process of  
racial reckoning to confront this incongruity in the 1960s. South Africa underwent 
its own transformation in the 1990s. Both nations are the better for it, despite tensions 
persisting and gross socio-economic inequalities continuing to plague society. With 
the dual system of  law that currently prevails in the occupied Palestinian territory 
best understood as the derivative of  an ongoing settler colonial process, logic dictates 
that Israel will inevitably reach the tipping point at which it is forced to confront its 
own racial realities vis-à-vis the Palestinians. While the shape that such a transfor-
mation ultimately takes will depend primarily on social attitudes and political craft, 
international law may retain a role through the light that it shines on the normative 
issues to be resolved in this context.
214 See, e.g., Ntsebeza v. Daimler, Khulumani v. Barclays International, 617 F Supp. 2d 228 (2009) (In Re South 
African Apartheid Litigation).
215 Reynolds, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and the Ghosts of  Apartheid’, in D. Keane and 
Y. McDermott (eds), The Challenge of  Human Rights: Past, Present and Future (2012).
216 For further discussion see Kearney and Reynolds, ‘Palestine and the Politics of  International Criminal 
Justice’, in W. Schabas et al. (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical 
Perspectives (2013).
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